explaining that “[p]ostponing consideration of the [constitutional] questions presented, until a more concrete controversy aries, also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportu- nity to construe [the challenged law], and perhaps in the pro- cess to materially alter the question to be decided” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[p]ostponing consideration of the [constitutional] questions presented, until a more concrete controversy aries, also has the advantage of permitting the state courts further opportu- nity to construe [the challenged law], and perhaps in the pro- cess to materially alter the question to be decided” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that lack of “precise language” to evaluate in relation to law at issue in free-speech controversy undercut ripeness of controversy and that case could not be decided “based upon the amorphous and ill-defined factual record presented to us”
- explaining that “[¡justiciability concerns not only the standing of litigants to assert particular claims, but also the appropriate timing of judicial intervention,"- requiring an inquiry into both mootness and ripeness
- holding the First Amendment claim asserted by voters and others challenging a California constitutional provision was non justiciable, after concluding the plaintiffs desire to support and oppose candidates, in public and in print, coupled with the voters desire to read such endorsements, was opposed by "no factual record of an actual or imminent application of [the challenged ... statute] sufficient to present the constitutional issues in 'clean-cut and concrete form.' ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Saint Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481 (2006)
We distinguish Renne, as we did in Butler, 146 F.3d at 560, because “the plaintiffs here have alleged a specific intent to pursue conduct in violation of the challenged statute.
Distinguished by Service Employees International Union v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 955 F.2d 1312 (1992)
Renne, however, is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
*325 Justice Stevens,
concurring.
The dissenting opinions in this case illustrate why the Court should decline review of the merits of the case in its present posture. Justice Marshall concludes that Article II, §6(b), of the California Constitution is invalid on its face because it is overbroad. Justice White, on the other hand, concludes that respondents’ complaint may not be construed as including a facial overbreadth challenge, and that § 6(b) is valid insofar as it is applied to petitioners’ policy of refusing to include endorsements in candidates’ campaign mailings.
Given the very real possibility that the outcome of this litigation depends entirely on whether the complaint should be construed as making a facial challenge or an as-applied challenge — for it is apparent that Justice White and Justice Marshall may both be interpreting the merits of their respective First Amendment questions correctly — and given the difficulty of determining whether respondents’ complaint against petitioners’ policy of deleting party endorsements from candidates’ statements may fairly be construed as including a facial overbreadth challenge, the Court is surely wise in refusing to address the merits on the present record.
Two other prudential concerns weigh against deciding the merits of this case. First, I am not sure that respondents’ challenge to petitioners’ policy of deleting party endorsements is ripe for review. If such a challenge had been brought by a political party or a party central committee, and if the complaint had alleged that these organizations wanted to endorse, support, or oppose a candidate for nonpartisan office but were inhibited from doing so because of the constitutional provision, the case would unquestionably be ripe. Cf. Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Central Comm., 489 U. S. 214 (1989). Because I do not believe an individual member of a party or committee may sue on behalf of such an organization, see Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U. S. 534, 544 (1986), however, no such plaintiff presenting a ripe controversy is before us. Alternatively, if this ac *326 tion had been brought by a candidate who had been endorsed by a political party and who sought to include that endorsement in his or her candidate’s statement, we would also be confronted with a ripe controversy.
Unlike such scenarios, however, the respondents in this case are voters. They claim, based on petitioners’ representations, that § 6(b) of the State Constitution forms the basis for petitioners’ policy of deleting party endorsements from candidates’ mailed statements. But there are at least two hurdles that these respondents must overcome before their claim would be ripe for judicial review. First, they must prove that political parties would endorse certain candidates if § 6(b) were repealed or invalidated. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 756 , and n. 14 (1976) (allowing listeners of potential speech to bring an anticipatory challenge where the parties stipulate that "a speaker exists”). Arguably, respondents have met this hurdle by offering several affidavits of members of party central committees stating that the committees plan to endorse candidates for nonpartisan office and to seek to have those endorsements publicized. See, e. g., App. 15. Second, respondents must prove that specific candidates for nonpartisan office would seek to mention the party endorsements in their statements if petitioners’ policy of deleting such endorsements were declared invalid (moreover, to prove injury to their interest as informed voters, respondents would perhaps also have to allege that they would not otherwise know about the endorsements if the endorsements are not included in mailed candidates’ statements). This latter hurdle has not, in my opinion, been met by respondents in such a way as to ensure that we are confronted by a definite and ripe controversy.
Moreover, I am troubled by the redressability issues inherent in this case. Respondents’ complaint has challenged § 6(b) of the State Constitution, but it has not challenged the validity of § 10012 of the California Elections Code. That sec *327 tion plainly prohibits the inclusion of the party affiliation of candidates in nonpartisan elections, and unquestionably would provide an adequate basis for petitioners’ challenged policy even if the constitutional prohibition against endorsements were invalidated. Even if we were to strike down § 6(b) as overbroad, then, it is unclear whether respondents’ alleged injury would be redressed.
These three unsettled issues — involving whether a facial overbreadth challenge may be construed to have been made, whether respondents’ challenge is ripe, and whether their injury is redressable — coalesce to convince me that review of the merits of respondents’ challenge is best left for another day and another complaint. No substantial hardship would accrue from a dismissal of respondents’ action without prejudice, and the courts would benefit from a more precise articulation of a current and definite controversy. I therefore join the Court’s opinion and judgment ordering the lower courts to dismiss the action without prejudice.