holding that regulations preventing physicians who par *737 ticipated in a federally funded program froip discussing abortion with their program-funded patients did not violate the physicians’ First Amendment rights because “[n]othing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold” and the effect of the regulations “cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her”
How later courts described this case
- holding that regulations preventing physicians who par *737 ticipated in a federally funded program froip discussing abortion with their program-funded patients did not violate the physicians’ First Amendment rights because “[n]othing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold” and the effect of the regulations “cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her”
- holding that regulations preventing physicians who participated in a federally funded program from discussing abortion with their program-funded patients did not violate the physicians' First Amendment rights because "[n]othing in [the regulations] requires a doctor to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold" and the effect of the regulations "cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her"
- holding that when the government is using its spending power, it does not violate the Constitution when it chooses to fund some viewpoints and not others; specifically, when it forbids employees to use federally provided funds in a program in which abortion is advised as a method of family planning
- explaining that the “unconstitutional conditions’ cases involve situations in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather Case No. 2:22-cv-4297 Page 11 of 13 than on a particular [federally-funded] program or service[.]” (emphasis in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Azar, 385 F. Supp. 3d 960 (2019)
The claim under Section 1554 is a matter of statutory interpretation to which Rust is inapposite.
Distinguished by Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Lockyer, 364 F.3d 1154 (2004)
The constitutional analysis of cases like Rust is inapposite in this case.8 Rather, the question we confront is the same one we would confront in any case of Machinists preemption: does the “ ‘exercise of plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help ... frustrate effective implementation of the Act’s processes[?
Distinguished by United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)
Relying on Velazquez, Justice Stevens argues mistakenly that Rust is inapposite because that case “only involved, and only applies to, . . . situations in which the government seeks to communicate a specific message,” post, at 228, and unlike the Title X program in Rust, the E-rate and LSTA programs “are not designed to foster or transmit any particular governmental message.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
dissenting.
“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). Justice Blackmun has explained well why this longstanding canon of statutory construction applies in these cases, and I join Part I of his dissent. Part II demonstrates why the challenged regulations, which constitute the Secretary’s interpretation of § 1008 of the Public Health Service Act, 84 Stat. 1508 , 42 U. S. C. § 300a-6, “raise serious constitutional problems”: the regulations place content-based restrictions on the speech of Title X fund recipients, restrictions directed precisely at speech concerning one of “the most divisive and contentious issues that our Nation has faced in recent years.” Ante, at 215.
One may well conclude, as Justice Blackmun does in Part II, that the regulations are unconstitutional for this reason. I do not join Part II of the dissent, however, for the same reason that I do not join Part III, in which Jus *224 tice Blackmun concludes that the regulations are unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The canon of construction that Justice Blackmun correctly applies here is grounded in large part upon our time-honored practice of not reaching constitutional questions unnecessarily. See DeBartolo, supra, at 575 . “It is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint . . . that this Court will not reach constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.” Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P. C., 467 U. S. 138, 157 (1984). See also Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U. S. 625, 633 (1972); Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295 (1905); Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U. S. 33, 39 (1885) (In the exercise of its jurisdiction to pronounce unconstitutional laws of the United States, this Court “has rigidly adhered” to the rule “never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it”).
This Court acts at the limits of its power when it invalidates a law on constitutional grounds. In recognition of our place, in the constitutional scheme, we must act with “great gravity and delicacy” when telling a coordinate branch that its actions are absolutely prohibited absent constitutional amendment. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U. S. 525, 544 (1923). See also Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 147-148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). In these cases, we need only tell the Secretary that his regulations are not a reasonable interpretation of the statute; we need not tell Congress that it cannot pass such legislation. If we rule solely on statutory grounds, Congress retains the power to force the constitutional question by legislating more explicitly. It may instead choose to do nothing. That decision should be left to Congress; we should not tell Congress what it cannot do before it has chosen to do it. It is enough in this litigation to conclude that neither the language nor the history of § 1008 compels the Secretary’s in *225 terpretation, and that the interpretation raises serious First Amendment concerns. On this basis alone, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and invalidate the challenged regulations.