explaining that the Court has stopped short of requiring immediate probable cause hearings because of “the burden that proliferation of pretrial proceedings places on the criminal justice system” and the fact that “the interests of everyone involved, including those persons who are arrested, might be disserved by introducing further procedural complexity into an already intricate system”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the Court has stopped short of requiring immediate probable cause hearings because of “the burden that proliferation of pretrial proceedings places on the criminal justice system” and the fact that “the interests of everyone involved, including those persons who are arrested, might be disserved by introducing further procedural complexity into an already intricate system”
- stating that “[w]here an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.”
- holding that a probable cause determination must be held within 48 hours of the arrest; even if held within 48 hours, it may be unconstitutional if such determination was “delayed unreasonably,” such as for the purpose of gathering additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested individual, or delay for delay’s sake
- finding that the bail hearings held within sixty-eight hours were constitutional under the Fourth Amendment, where the plaintiffs were arrested on a Friday and a Saturday and waited until Monday at 1:30 p.m. to receive a bail hearing—with the longest waiting sixty-eight hours—and a judge had made an ex parte probable cause determination within forty-eight hours
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Dunn v. City of Chicago, 231 F.R.D. 367 (2005)
Defendant cites Robinson v. Gillespie, 219 F.R.D. 179 (D.Kan.2003), which denied class certification of McLaughlin detention claims, but Robinson is readily distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
with whom Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103 (1975), this Court held that an individual detained following a warrantless arrest is entitled to a “prompt” judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any further restraint on his liberty. See id., at 114-116, 125 . I agree with Justice Scalia that a probable-cause hearing is sufficiently “prompt” under Gerstein only when provided immediately upon completion of the “administrative steps incident to arrest,” id., at 114 . See post, at 62-63. Because the Court of Appeals correctly held that the County of Riverside must provide probable-cause hearings as soon as it completes the administrative steps incident to arrest, see 888 F. 2d 1276 , 1278 (CA9 1989), I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, I dissent.