holding that harmless error analysis applies to the wrongful admission at trial of coerced confessions; explaining that the essential feature of "trial errors” is that they occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, "and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless”; and explaining further that "structural errors” are not subject to this harmless error analysis, primarily because “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected” by them — so, the trial cannot then reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair
How later courts described this case
- holding that harmless error analysis applies to the wrongful admission at trial of coerced confessions; explaining that the essential feature of "trial errors” is that they occur during the presentation of the case to the jury, "and may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless”; and explaining further that "structural errors” are not subject to this harmless error analysis, primarily because “[t]he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously affected” by them — so, the trial cannot then reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair
- explaining that by classifying most constitutional errors — including coerced confessions — as "trial errors,” the Court remains faithful to the view that harmless error is necessary to preserve the " '[p]rinciple that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of a defendant’s guilt or innocence and promote public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.' ”
- stating that while some types of trial errors are susceptible to “quantitative [ ] assessment] in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether ... [the errors were] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” other kinds of errors are not subject to harmless-error analysis, but constitute “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism” and “so affect[ ] the framework [of] ... trial” that they require automatic reversal
- explaining that structural errors are “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-error’ standards,” in contrast to “trial errors,” which are errors that occur during the presentation of the case to the factfinder and which “may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented” to determine if the error was harmless
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Whitely, 356 F. App'x 839 (2009)
We reject this contention, as the "structural error” cases he cites — Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) — originated outside the federal system, and the Supreme Court has expressly declined to carve out such an exception.
Distinguished by a later decision, 111 F.3d 720 (1997)
See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 293, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1256, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (harmless error analysis is inapplicable to convictions involving race discrimination in grand jury selection or trial by biased judge); Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263, 106 S.Ct. 617, 623, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (exclusion of blacks from grand jury pool is not harmless even after a fair trial because "[w]hen constitutiona…
Distinguished by Luu v. People, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1783 (1992)
Luu contends that the court of appeals’ reliance on Fulminante is misplaced because Rushen is distinguishable from Luu’s case.
The opinion
*313 Justice Kennedy,
concurring in the judgment.
For the reasons stated by The Chief Justice, I agree that Fulminante’s confession to Anthony Sarivola was not coerced. In my view, the trial court did not err in admitting this testimony. A majority of the Court, however, finds the confession coerced and proceeds to consider whether harmless-error analysis may be used when a coerced confession has been admitted at trial. With the case in this posture, it is appropriate for me to address the harmless-error issue.
Again for the reasons stated by The Chief Justice, I agree that harmless-error analysis should apply in the case of a coerced confession. That said, the court conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished, for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that incriminates the defendant only when connected with other evidence. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant’s plea of innocence. For the reasons given by Justice White in Part IV of his opinion, I cannot with confidence find admission of Fulmi-nante’s confession to Anthony Sarivola to be harmless error.
The same majority of the Court does not agree on the three issues presented by the trial court’s determination to admit Fulminante’s first confession: whether the confession was inadmissible because coerced; whether harmless-error analysis is appropriate; and if so whether any error was harmless here. My own view that the confession was not coerced does not command a majority.
In the interests of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept in the case now before us the holding of five Justices that the *314 confession was coerced and inadmissible. I agree with a majority of the Court that admission of the confession could not be harmless error when viewed in light of all the other evidence; and so I concur in the judgment to affirm the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court.