stating that because —————— 9 See Nat. Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report, pp. 6–1 to 6–2 (1999), online at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/6.pdf (as visited Apr. 30, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). 18 MICHIGAN v. BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court “Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with” or limit tribal immunity, “we are not disposed to modify” its scope
How later courts described this case
- stating that because —————— 9 See Nat. Gambling Impact Study Comm’n, Final Report, pp. 6–1 to 6–2 (1999), online at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/6.pdf (as visited Apr. 30, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). 18 MICHIGAN v. BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY Opinion of the Court “Congress has always been at liberty to dispense with” or limit tribal immunity, “we are not disposed to modify” its scope
- stating that the test for determining whether land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that land is denominated “‘trust land’” or “‘reservation’” but, rather, “whether the area has been ‘validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the 20 No. 103430-0 Government’” (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 , 98 S. Ct. 2541 , 57 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1978))
- holding that filing a lawsuit constitutes a limited 10 waiver as to the court’s decision on the claims brought by the Tribe, but not as to 11 separate, adversarial counterclaims brought against the Tribe
- finding that plaintiff tribe did not waive its immunity as to defendants’ counterclaim for taxes because the counterclaim requested relief beyond that sought by plaintiff, who sought only injunctive relief
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Davids v. Coyhis, 869 F. Supp. 1401 (1994)
id. at 510, 111 S.Ct. at 909, nevertheless arguably called into question its earlier holdings of complete tribal immunity from suit.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Cooper, 928 P.2d 406 (1996)
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991), relied on by Cooper, is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is founded upon an anachronistic fiction. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 414-416 (1979). In my opinion all Governments — federal, state, and tribal — should generally be accountable for their illegal conduct. The rule that an Indian tribe is immune from an action for damages absent its consent is, however, an established part of our law. See United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 512-513 *515 (1940). Nevertheless, I am not sure that the rule of tribal sovereign immunity extends to cases arising from a tribe’s conduct of commercial activity outside its own territory, cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1605 (a) (“A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case ... (2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state ...”), or that it applies to claims for prospective equitable relief against a tribe, cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 664-665 (1974) (Eleventh Amendment bars suits against States for retroactive monetary relief, but not for prospective injunctive relief).
In analyzing whether the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe can be held prospectively liable for taxes on the sale of cigarettes, the Court today in effect acknowledges limits to a tribe’s sovereign immunity, although it does not do so explicitly. The Court affirms the Court of Appeals’ holding that the Oklahoma Tax Commission’s counterclaim against the Tribe was properly dismissed on grounds of the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, but then proceeds to address the precise question raised in the counterclaim — whether the Tribe in the future can be assessed for taxes on its sales of cigarettes. The Court indulges in this anomaly by reasoning that the issue of the Tribe’s prospective liability “is fairly subsumed” in the Tribe’s main action seeking to have the tax commission enjoined from collecting back taxes. See ante, at 512.
In my opinion, however, the issue of prospective liability is properly presented only in the tax commission’s counterclaim. It is quite possible to decide that the Tribe cannot be liable for past sales taxes which it never collected without going on to decide whether the tax commission may require the Tribe to collect state taxes on its sales in the first place. In my opinion the Court correctly reaches the issue of the Tribe’s prospective liability and correctly holds that the State may collect taxes on tribal sales to non-Indians. My purpose in writing separately is to emphasize that the Court’s holding *516 in effect rejects the argument that this governmental entity — the Tribe — is completely immune from legal process. By addressing the substance of the tax commission’s claim for prospective injunctive relief against the Tribe, the Court today recognizes that a tribe’s sovereign immunity from actions seeking money damages does not necessarily extend to actions seeking equitable relief.