stating that a remand under “[t]he sixth sentence of § 405(g) . . . [is] appropriate when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that proceeding” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- stating that a remand under “[t]he sixth sentence of § 405(g) . . . [is] appropriate when the district court learns of evidence not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding that might have changed the outcome of that proceeding” (emphasis added)
- stating that “post-enactment legislative history” is an oxymo *919 ron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the legislative body that enacted the statute
- stating that “post-enactment legislative history” is an oxymoron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the same legislative body that enacted the statute
- stating that Apost-enactment legislative history@ is an oxymoron and should not be considered in interpreting statutes and that even the proponents of its use limit it to statements from members of the same legislative body that enacted the statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Kowalick v. Sullivan, 812 F. Supp. 534 (1993)
However, while plaintiff did not make the argument, it should be noted that two Supreme Court cases announced since Hudson, Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 110 S.Ct. 2658, 110 L.Ed.2d 563 (1990) and Melkonyan, seem to call into question the continuing validity of the Hudson opinion.
Questioned by Gregory Luna v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 948 F.2d 169 (1991)
110 S.Ct. 2658, 2664-66, “the Supreme Court has called into question the assumption that district courts retain jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s determinations following remand.” 937 F.2d at 256. “[Tjhe Court’s analysis of § 405(g) lends strong support to the Secretary’s contention that the district court properly divested itself of jurisdiction when it remanded Frizzell’s c
Distinguished
Distinguished by Government of the Virgin Islands v. Crooke, 54 V.I. 237 (2010)
Thus Finkelstein and any principle it espouses are inapplicable to this case.
Distinguished by Joseph Labrie v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 976 F.2d 779 (1992)
at 630, 110 S.Ct. at 2666, was distinguishable: the concern there was with the interpretation of the term “any civil action” in the EAJA, not with the appealability of a remand order under § 1291.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I am not convinced, as the other Members of the Court appear to be, that the order with which we are concerned is a final decision. It seems to me that the Court in its opinion expends its energy fending off respondent’s arguments as to nonappealability, without itself demonstrating finality in a positive way.
I concur in the judgment, however. Although I think the order is not a final decision under 28 U. S. C. § 1291 , it is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine enunciated in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1949). This is the view adopted by the great majority of the Courts of Appeals, and I am in agreement with their conclusions. See, e. g., Colon v. Secretary of HHS, 877 F. 2d 148, 151-152 (CA1 1989); Doughty v. Bowen, 839 F. 2d 644, 645-646 (CA10 1988); Huie v. Bowen, 788 F. 2d 698, 701-703 (CA11 1986).