holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on an anonymous tip because “the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller” and because “‘the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.”’ (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983))
How later courts described this case
- holding that police had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle based on an anonymous tip because “the independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of the informer’s predictions imparted some degree of reliability to the other allegations made by the caller” and because “‘the anonymous [tip] contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.”’ (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983))
- holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion when he stopped defendant “just short” of a predicted motel after an anonymous tipster provided specific details regarding the apartment from which defendant would depart, defendant’s time of departure, defendant’s brown attaché case containing cocaine, and defendant’s brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight, in addition to police observations of defendant leaving the specified apartment at the designated time in a car matching the tipster’s description
- stating that anonymous tip may serve as basis for vehicle stop because reasonable suspicion is less demanding standard than probable cause “not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause”
- explaining that "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by State v. Martinez, 314 Mont. 434 (2003)
¶51 Therefore, we decline to adopt the Alabama Court’s reasoning that the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of an anonymous or otherwise unreliable informant may be inferred when police corroborate wholly innocent facts about the alleged criminal actor and no independent information indicates that the suspect is involved in the alleged crime or even that a crime has occurred or is occurring.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ex Parte Barnette, 624 So. 2d 507 (1993)
I realize that Barnette argues that the facts in Alabama v. White are distinguishable from the facts in this case, and clearly there are some differences in the facts, but I believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly determined that the rule of law set forth in White is controlling.
Distinguished by Sapp v. State, 592 So. 2d 786 (1992)
We believe White is factually distinguishable.
The opinion
*333 Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall join, dissenting.
Millions of people leave their apartments at about the same time every day carrying an attaché case and heading for a destination known to their neighbors. Usually, however, the neighbors do not know what the briefcase contains. An anonymous neighbor’s prediction about somebody’s time of departure and probable destination is anything but a reliable basis for assuming that the commuter is in possession of an illegal substance—particularly when the person is not even carrying the attaché case described by the tipster.
The record in this case does not tell us how often respondent drove from the Lynwood Terrace Apartments to Dobey’s Motel; for all we know, she may have been a room clerk or telephone operator working the evening shift. It does not tell us whether Officer Davis made any effort to ascertain the informer’s identity, his reason for calling, or the basis of his prediction about respondent’s destination. Indeed, for all that this record tells us, the tipster may well have been another police officer who had a “hunch” that respondent might have cocaine in her attaché case.
Anybody with enough knowledge about a given person to make her the target of a prank, or to harbor a grudge against her, will certainly be able to formulate a tip about her like the one predicting Vanessa White’s excursion. In addition, under the Court’s holding, every citizen is subject to being seized and questioned by any officer who is prepared to testify that the warrantless stop was based on an anonymous tip predicting whatever conduct the officer just observed. Fortunately, the vast majority of those in our law enforcement community would not adopt such a practice. But the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the citizen from the overzealous and unscrupulous officer as well as from those who are conscientious and truthful. This decision makes a mockery of that protection.
I respectfully dissent.