holding that service of process upon a non-resident defendant while he is physically present in the forum state confers personal jurisdiction, even though the defendant was only briefly in the state and the litigation did not arise out of his activities there
How later courts described this case
- holding that service of process upon a non-resident defendant while he is physically present in the forum state confers personal jurisdiction, even though the defendant was only briefly in the state and the litigation did not arise out of his activities there
- concluding that “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”
- holding that service of process confers state court jurisdiction over physically present nonresident, regardless of whether he was only briefly in state or whether cause of action is related to his activities there
- holding that due process requires no connection between the litigation and the forum state if the defendant is a natural person and is “physically present in the State at the time process is served upon him”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by James v. Illinois Central Railroad, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 1227 (1998)
Further, we refuse to extend the logic of Burnham to the facts before this Court.
Limited by Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705 (2012)
The district court declined to find jurisdiction on this basis because (1) service of process was not made on Zakharov personally, but was actually made on Zakharov’s agent by certified mail while Zakharov was not present in the state, and (2) because there was no majority opinion in Burnham and it should be limited to its facts, a holding that has some support in other jurisdictions.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
As I explained in my separate writing, I did not join the Court’s opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186 (1977), because I was concerned by its unnecessarily broad reach. Id,., at 217-219 (opinion concurring in judgment). The same concern prevents me from joining either Justice Scalia’s or Justice Brennan’s opinion in this case. For me, it is sufficient to note that the historical evidence and consensus identified by Justice Scalia, the considerations of fairness identified by Justice Brennan, and the common sense displayed by Justice White, all combine to demonstrate that this is, indeed, a very easy case. * Accordingly, I agree that the judgment should be affirmed.
Perhaps the adage about hard eases making bad law should be revised to cover easy cases.