holding that a similar definition of "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, "requires the trial court to look only to the fact of 1"Physical force" means "violent force": "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 137 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 , 140 (2010)). - 4 - conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a similar definition of "violent felony" in the Armed Career Criminal Act, or ACCA, "requires the trial court to look only to the fact of 1"Physical force" means "violent force": "force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person." United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 137 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 , 140 (2010)). - 4 - conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense"
- concluding, in the context of a prior conviction for burglary, that the enhancement statute “generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense,” but “may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary”
- concluding that sentencing enhancements for prior burglary convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) must depend on a uniform federal definition of “burglary” rather than on the definition of burglary adopted by the state of conviction, and also noting that there is a general presumption against interpreting federal criminal laws so as to make their application dependent on state law
- explaining that “[f]or example, in a State whose burglary statutes include entry of an automobile as well as a building, ... then the Government should be allowed to use the conviction for enhancement” if it can present appropriate documents showing that the defendant was charged with, and necessarily found guilty of, burglary of a building rather than burglary of an automobile
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by United States v. Eddie Lipscomb, 619 F.3d 474 (2010)
We reject Lipscomb’s argument that we must apply the categorical approach crafted by the Supreme Court in Taylor and its progeny.5 Such a rule would require the sentencing court to use the indictment only to determine the statutory phrase that is the basis of conviction.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Davis, 291 F. App'x 563 (2008)
Of course, it is possible that Hawkins has reviewed Davis’s underlying Arizona convictions and their respective sentencing documents and has determined that under Taylor it would be frivolous to argue that the enhancement is inapplicable.8 If so, we have not been apprised, contrary to Hawkins’s duty under Anders.
Distinguished by People v. Lewis, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 629 (2001)
) As we have explained, Taylor is distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Mayfield, 5 Cal. 4th 142 (1993)
) Thus in our view, Taylor is distinguishable: the focus there was not on the defendant’s background and character and certain past criminal conduct viewed as a whole, but merely on certain prior criminal convictions, the facts of which the federal high court implicitly held should not be retried because to do so would be inefficient. (495 U.S. at pp. 601-602 [109 L.Ed.2d at pp. 628-
The opinion
*603 Justice Scalia,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join in the Court’s opinion except for Part II, which examines in great detail the statute’s legislative history. The examination does not uncover anything useful (i. e., anything that tempts us to alter the meaning we deduce from the text anyway), but that is the usual consequence of these inquiries (and a good thing, too). What is noteworthy, however, is that in this case it is hard to understand what we would have done if we had found anything useful. The Court says, correctly, that the statutory term “burglary” has a “generally accepted contemporary meaning” which must be given effect and which may not be modified by the rule of lenity. Ante, at 596, 598. But if the meaning is so clear that it cannot be constricted by that venerable canon of construction, surely it is not so ambiguous that it can be constricted by the sundry floor statements, witness testimony, and other legislative incunabula that the Court discusses. Is it conceivable that we look to the legislative history only to determine whether it displays, not a less extensive punitive intent than the plain meaning (the domain of the rule of lenity), but a more extensive one? If we found a more extensive one, I assume we would then have to apply the rule of lenity, bringing us back once again to the ordinary meaning of the statute. It seems like a lot of trouble.
I can discern no reason for devoting 10 pages of today’s opinion to legislative history, except to show that we have given this case close and careful consideration. We must find some better way of demonstrating our conscientiousness.