holding "that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted"
How later courts described this case
- holding "that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted"
- finding that the English common law and early American jurisprudence reject any transactional or same conduct test, and accepting Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299, 304; 52 S Ct 180; 76 L Ed 306 [1932], as the correct analysis
- finding a double jeopardy bar if the subsequent prosecution requires proof of conduct that constituted an offense for which defendant has already been prosecuted
- forbidding the State from charging a defendant who was convicted of a crime from being subject to later prosecution for other crimes arising out of the same criminal episode if the State is required to re-prove conduct from the first conviction
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 206, expressly overruled).
Overruled — as noted by 17 later courts
that Grady [v. Corbin] must be overruled.
17 citing opinionsOverruled by Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 510 U.S. 126 (1993)
— U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2860, 126 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (overruling the “same-conduct” test announced in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990)).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Halsey v. Clarke, 821 F. Supp. 1319 (1993)
Cf. United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 414, 415 (the rule set forth in Grady is inapplicable where, after jury was dismissed without passing on charge of assault separately set forth in first indictment, the state attempts to retry defendants on the assault charge).
Distinguished by Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892 (1992)
Since these convictions were obtained in a single trial, the rule announced in Grady is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Prince v. Lockhart, 971 F.2d 118 (1992)
The district court held, and we agree, that Grady is inapplicable here.
Distinguished by Thomas E. White v. Dick Clark, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison and Indiana Attorney General, 958 F.2d 375 (1992)
The modifications of the Blockburger test set forth in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), are inapplicable to this case as they concern subsequent prosecutions.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
dissenting.
I agree with much of what Justice Scalia says in his dissenting opinion. I write separately, however, to note that my dissent is premised primarily on my view that the incon *525 sistency between the Court’s opinion today and Dowling v. United States, 493 U. S. 342 (1990), decided earlier this Term, indicates that the Court has strayed from a proper interpretation of the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
In Dowling , we considered whether an eyewitness’ testimony regarding a robbery for which Dowling had been acquitted was admissible at a second trial of Dowling for an unrelated robbery. The eyewitness had testified at the first trial that a man had entered her house “wearing a knitted mask with cutout eyes and carrying a small handgun” and that his mask had come off during a struggle, revealing his identity. Id., at 344 . Based on this evidence, Dowling had been charged with burglary, attempted robbery, assault, and weapons offenses, but was acquitted of all charges. At a second trial for an unrelated bank robbery, the Government attempted to use the witness’ testimony to prove Dowling’s identity as a robber. We held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the introduction of the evidence: Because the prior acquittal did not necessarily represent a jury determination that Dowling was not the masked man who had entered the witness’ home, the testimony was admissible in the second trial to prove identity. Id., at 348-352 .
The Court’s ruling today effectively renders our holding in Dowling a nullity in many circumstances. If a situation identical to that in Dowling arose after today’s decision, a conscientious judge attempting to apply the test enunciated by the Court, ante, at 510, 521, would probably conclude that the witness’ testimony was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The record in Dowling indicated that the Government was offering the eyewitness testimony to establish the defendant’s identity, “an essential element of an offense charged in [the subsequent] prosecution,” ante, at 521, and that the testimony would likely “prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.” Ibid. See App. in Dowling v. United States, O. T. 1989, No. 88-6025, pp. 15-29. Under the Court’s rea *526 soning, the Government’s attempt to introduce the eyewitness testimony would bar the second prosecution of Dowling for bank robbery. As a practical matter, this means that the same evidence ruled admissible in Dowling is barred by Grady.
The Court’s decision is also inconsistent with Dowling's, approach to longstanding rules of evidence. Although we declined in Dowling to adopt a reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause that would “exclude in all circumstances . . . relevant and probative evidence that is otherwise admissible” under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and other Federal Rules of Evidence, 493 U. S., at 348 , the wide sweep of the Court’s decision today casts doubt on the continued vitality of Rule 404(b), which makes evidence of “other crimes” admissible for proving “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”
In my view, Dowling correctly delineated the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause’s protection. Accordingly, the inconsistency between our decision in Dowling and the Court’s decision today leads me to reject the Court’s expansive interpretation of the Clause. I respectfully dissent.