holding that even in times of significant labor-management strife, union enjoys continuing "presumption of majority support" rebuttable only "by showing that ... (1) the union did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) the employer had a 'good faith' doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of the union's majority support."
How later courts described this case
- holding that even in times of significant labor-management strife, union enjoys continuing "presumption of majority support" rebuttable only "by showing that ... (1) the union did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) the employer had a 'good faith' doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of the union's majority support."
- explaining that because "the NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying national labor policy," courts will uphold any rule that is "rational and consistent with the [NLRA], even if we would have formulated a different rule had we sat on the Board" (internal citation omitted)
- finding it not irrational for NLRB to refuse to apply presumption that replacement workers do not support striking union, in light of Board's assumptions drawn from its expertise
- holding that Board has “considerable deference” in determining the legal rule to apply and should be upheld “as long as it is rational and consistent with the Act”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*797 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concurring.
The Board’s “no-presumption” rule seems to me to press to the limit the deference to which the Board is entitled in assessing industrial reality, but for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court I agree that limit is not exceeded. The Court of Appeals did not consider, free from the use of any presumption, whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Board’s determination here, and I believe that is a question best left for the Court of Appeals on remand.
By refusing to allow the employer to resort to what would seem to be commonsense assumptions about the views of an entire class of workers — those hired to replace strikers — the Board sharply limits the means by which an employer might satisfy the “good-faith doubt” requirement. Although the Board’s opinion in this case does not preclude a finding of good-faith doubt based on circumstantial evidence, some recent decisions suggest that it now requires an employer to show that individual employees have “expressed desires” to, repudiate the incumbent union in order to establish a reasonable doubt of the union’s majority status. See Tube Craft, Inc., 289 N. L. R. B. 862, n. 2 (1988); Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 289 N. L. R. B. 358, 361 (1988); Tile, Terrazzo & Marble Contractors Assn., 287 N. L. R. B. 769, n. 2 (1987). It appears that another of the Board’s rules prevents the employer from polling its employees unless it first establishes a good-faith doubt of majority status. See Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N. L. R. B. 1057, 1064 (1989) (the standard for employer polling is the same as the standard for withdrawal of recognition). I have considerable- doubt whether the Board may insist that good-faith doubt be determined only on the basis of sentiments of individual'employees, and at the same time bar the employer from using what might be the only effective means of determining those sentiments. But that issue is not before us today.