explaining that “a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found” and may last “no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “a protective sweep, aimed at protecting the arresting officers, if justified by the circumstances, is nevertheless not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found” and may last “no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises”
- holding that officers may search beyond the area immediately adjoining the place of arrest whenever “articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene”
- holding that to justify protective sweep of premises in which arrest is made "there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene"
- concluding that officers who had an arrest warrant and probable cause to believe that the defendant was in his house could search anywhere in the. house in which he might be found, but that once he was found there was no longer that particular justification for entering any rooms that had not yet been searched
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in State v. Laboo — not on the Supreme Court's list
494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (recognizing an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement of a search warrant where officers have a reasonable belief based on facts that “the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene”), superseded by rule as stated in State v. Laboo, 933 A.2d 4
Distinguished
Distinguished by Guzman v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 84 (2012)
We agree that Buie is clearly distinguishable.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 114 (2007)
Both decisions relied on the quoted language from Maryland v. Buie, but both are distinguishable from the defendant’s case.
Distinguished by United States v. Bute, 823 F. Supp. 1561 (1993)
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990), upon which the defendants heavily rely, is distinguishable on both the facts and law applicable to the case at hand.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
The Court adopts the prudent course of explaining the general rule and permitting the state court to apply it in the first instance. The concurrence by Justice Stevens, however, makes the gratuitous observation that the State has a formidable task on remand. My view is quite to the contrary. Based on my present understanding of the record, I should think the officers’ conduct here was in full accord with standard police safety procedure, and that the officers would have been remiss if they had not taken these precautions. This comment is necessary, lest by acquiescence the impression be left that Justice Stevens’ views can be interpreted as authoritative guidance for application of our ruling to the facts of the case.