concluding that the employer met its “relatively light burden” of convincing the Court that is practice was arguably justified by the implied terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but emphasizing that in rendering such a decision it did not “seek to minimize any force in the Union’s arguments that the discretion afforded [the employer] by the parties’ implied agreement, as interpreted in light of past practice, cannot be understood to extend this far”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the employer met its “relatively light burden” of convincing the Court that is practice was arguably justified by the implied terms of the collective bargaining agreement, but emphasizing that in rendering such a decision it did not “seek to minimize any force in the Union’s arguments that the discretion afforded [the employer] by the parties’ implied agreement, as interpreted in light of past practice, cannot be understood to extend this far”
- holding that the The district courts have inclusion of drug testing as part of subject-matter railroad’s physical examinations jurisdiction to enjoin a arguably was justified by implied terms violation of the status of collective bargaining agreement, and quo pending completion therefore dispute was minor
- holding that the distinction between major and minor disputes turns not on a “case-by-case determination of the importance of the issue presented,” but on whether “the terms of an existing agreement either establish or refute the presence of a right to take the disputed action”
- holding that carrier’s unilateral implementation of a drug-screening policy was arguably justified because the carrier’s long-term practice of conducting physical examinations on employees established that practice as an implied term of the collective bargaining agreement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins,
dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated by that court. The routine medical examinations Conrail relies on as precedent for its drug-testing program could result, at most, in an employee being held out of service until his or her health improved. Conrail would have us believe that, in accepting such medical testing, the Union (arguably) agreed to testing for use of an illegal substance that could result in the employee’s firing. It is unsurprising that the Union agreed to nonpunitive medical testing, and that it acquiesced in the employer making such unilateral changes in testing procedures as it determined were advisable on the basis of current medical technology. But it is inconceivable to me that in so doing the Union was also agreeing to the systematic, suspicionless testing, on such terms and in such manner as the employer alone prescribed, of all employees for evidence of criminal activity that, under the employer’s plan, could result in discharge. * Such a contention, in my view, is not “arguable” — it is frivolous. I agree with the Court of Appeals that “[ujltimately, Conrail’s argument rests on the premise that testing urine for cannabis metabolites is no different in kind from testing urine for blood sugar. This *322 ignores considerable differences in what is tested for and the consequences thereof.” 845 F. 2d 1187, 1194 (CA3 1988).
It may be helpful to note what the general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board had to say in addressing the somewhat similar question whether, under the National Labor Relations Act, the addition of drug testing to a previously required physical examination constitutes a “substantial change in working conditions”:
“In cases where an employer has an existing program of mandatory physical examinations for employees or applicants, an issue arises as to whether the addition of drug testing constitutes a substantial change in the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. In general, we conclude that it does constitute such a change. When conjoined with discipline, up to and including discharge, for refusing to submit to the test or for testing positive, the addition of a drug test substantially changes the nature and fundamental purpose of the existing physical examination. Generally, a physical examination is designed to test physical fitness to.perform the work. A drug test is designed to determine whether an employee or applicant uses drugs, irrespective of whether such usage interferes with ability to perform work.” NLRB General Counsel’s Memorandum on Drug and Alcohol Testing, Memorandum GC 87-5 (Sept. 8,1987), reprinted in BNA Daily Labor Report, No. 184, pp. D-l, D-2 (Sept. 24, 1987) (emphasis in original).
The general counsel similarly concluded that “a union’s acquiescence in a past practice of requiring applicants and/or current employees to submit to physical examinations that did not include drug testing . . . does not constitute a waiver of the union’s right to bargain over drug testing.” Ibid.
Without suggesting that the NLRA question of a “substantial change in working conditions” is precisely the same as the one before us, I do think the general counsel has a better un *323 derstanding than does the Court of the relationship between drug testing and routine physical examinations. I respectfully dissent.
The Court rests its holding that the purpose of Conrail’s drug tests is — arguably—medical rather than disciplinary solely on the ground that Conrail will not discharge an employee on the basis of one positive drug test standing alone and that it will permit the employee “a period of rehabilitative treatment” prior to a second test. Ante, at 319. I do not agree that these factors even arguably bring Conrail’s drug-testing program within the realm of the existing medical examinations. Beyond this, however, I note that under the Court’s reasoning the outcome of the ease should be different if the employer’s policy were indeed “to discharge an employee because of a single positive drug test.” Ibid.