explaining that legal assistant time could be billed separately at market rates if it is the prevailing practice in a given community, but “[i]f it is the practice in the relevant market not to do so, or to bill the work of [legal assistants] only at cost, -that is all that [the attorneys’ fee provision] requires”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that legal assistant time could be billed separately at market rates if it is the prevailing practice in a given community, but “[i]f it is the practice in the relevant market not to do so, or to bill the work of [legal assistants] only at cost, -that is all that [the attorneys’ fee provision] requires”
- stating that “compensation received several years after the services were rendered—as it frequently is in complex civil rights litigation—is not equivalent to the same dollar amount received reasonably promptly as the legal services are performed, as would normally be the case with private billings”
- holding that “reasonable attorney’s fee” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 “must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but also of secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client”
- holding that the district court did not err, as part of awarding attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, by compensating the plaintiffs for the work of law clerks and paralegals at market rates, rather than at their cost to the attorney
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847 (1997)
491 U.S. 274, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (1989), we conclude that the Supreme Court’s reasoning is inapplicable to our Idaho Rule 54(e)(3), I.R.C.P.
The opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting.
I agree with Justice O’Connor that the Eleventh Amendment does not permit an award of attorney’s fees against a State which includes compensation for delay in payment. Unlike Justice O’Connor, however, I do not agree with the *296 Court’s approval of the award of law clerk and paralegal fees made here.
Title 42 U. S. C. § 1988 gives the district courts discretion to allow the prevailing party in an action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 “a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” The Court reads this language as authorizing recovery of “a ‘reasonable’ fee for the attorney’s work product,” ante, at 285, which, the Court concludes, may include separate compensation for the services of law clerks and paralegals. But the statute itself simply uses the very familiar term “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” which to those untutored in the Court’s linguistic juggling means a fee charged for services rendered by an individual who has been licensed to practice law. Because law clerks and paralegals have not been licensed to practice law in Missouri, it is difficult to see how charges for their services may be separately billed as part of “attorney’s fees.” And since a prudent attorney customarily includes compensation for the cost of law clerk and paralegal services, like any other sort of office overhead — from secretarial staff, janitors, and librarians, to telephone service, stationery, and paper clips — in his own hourly billing rate, allowing the prevailing party to recover separate compensation for law clerk and paralegal services may result in “double recovery.”
The Court finds justification for its ruling in the fact that the prevailing practice among attorneys in Kansas City is to bill clients separately for the services of law clerks and paralegals. But I do not think Congress intended the meaning of the statutory term “attorney’s fee” to expand and contract with each and every vagary of local billing practice. Under the Court’s logic, prevailing parties could recover at market rates for the cost of secretaries, private investigators, and other types of lay personnel who assist the attorney in preparing his case, so long as they could show that the prevailing practice in the local market was to bill separately for these services. Such a result would be a sufficiently drastic departure from the traditional concept of “attorney’s fees” that I *297 believe new statutory authorization should be required for it. That permitting separate billing of law clerk and paralegal hours at market rates might “ ‘reduc[e] the spiraling cost of civil rights litigation’ ” by encouraging attorneys to delegate to these individuals tasks which they would otherwise perform themselves at higher cost, ante, at 288, and n. 10, may be a persuasive reason for Congress to enact such additional legislation. It is not, however, a persuasive reason for us to rewrite the legislation which Congress has in fact enacted. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U. S. 386, 398 (1984) (“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement”).
I also disagree with the State’s suggestion that law clerk and paralegal expenses incurred by a prevailing party, if not recoverable at market rates as “attorney’s fees” under § 1988, are nonetheless recoverable at actual cost under that statute. The language of § 1988 expands the traditional definition of “costs” to include “a reasonable attorney’s fee,” but it cannot fairly be read to authorize the recovery of all other out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred by the prevailing party in the course of litigation. Absent specific statutory authorization for the recovery of such expenses, the prevailing party remains subject to the limitations on cost recovery imposed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 28 U. S. C. § 1920 , which govern the taxation of costs in federal litigation where a cost-shifting statute is not applicable. Section 1920 gives the district court discretion to tax certain types of costs against the losing party in any federal litigation. The statute specifically enumerates six categories of expenses which may be taxed as costs: fees of the court clerk and marshal; fees of the court reporter; printing fees and witness fees; copying fees; certain docket fees; and fees of court-appointed experts and interpreters. We have held that this list is exclusive. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U. S. 437 (1987). Since none of these categories can possibly be construed to include the fees of law clerks and paralegals, *298 I would also hold that reimbursement for these expenses may not be separately awarded at actual cost.
I would therefore reverse the award of reimbursement for law clerk and paralegal expenses.