holding that protected liberty the Board's procedures. License and Amortization Appeal interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or the Bd. Rules of Procedure § 5.02(A). Accordingly, we hold that laws of the states and that a state creates a protected liberty appellants did not waive the contentions in their motion for interest by placing substantive limits on official discretion, summary judgment that the Board's decision could not be such as “mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding upheld because of due process concerns related to the public that the relevant criteria have been met”
How later courts described this case
- holding that protected liberty the Board's procedures. License and Amortization Appeal interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or the Bd. Rules of Procedure § 5.02(A). Accordingly, we hold that laws of the states and that a state creates a protected liberty appellants did not waive the contentions in their motion for interest by placing substantive limits on official discretion, summary judgment that the Board's decision could not be such as “mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding upheld because of due process concerns related to the public that the relevant criteria have been met”
- holding that a regulation that stated a visitor “may be excluded” when officials find reasonable grounds to believe that the “visitor’s presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution’s security or interfere with [its] orderly operation,” did not contain the necessary mandatory language to create a liberty interest
- holding that “an inmate’s interest in unfettered visitation is [not] guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause. We have rejected the notion that ‘any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause.’”
- explaining that courts “examine procedural due process questions in two steps”: first, the court “asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State,” and second, the court “examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part, on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) — not on the Supreme Court's list
490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted), partially overruled on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472
Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 19, 199516 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead it
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
I concur fully in the opinion and judgment of the Court. I write separately to note that this case involves a denial of prison access to particular visitors, not a general ban on all prison visitation. Nothing in the Court’s opinion forecloses the claim that a prison regulation permanently forbidding all visits to some or all prisoners implicates the protections of the Due Process Clause in a way that the precise and individualized restrictions at issue here do not.