holding that it is a “rare case” where a civil fine implicates the protections of double jeopardy and specifically limiting such a case to situations in which the amount of the sanction is “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the damages caused by the wrongful conduct and, thus, “bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as ‘punishment’ within the plain meaning of the word.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that it is a “rare case” where a civil fine implicates the protections of double jeopardy and specifically limiting such a case to situations in which the amount of the sanction is “overwhelmingly disproportionate” to the damages caused by the wrongful conduct and, thus, “bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the government for its loss, but rather appears to qualify as ‘punishment’ within the plain meaning of the word.”
- recognizing that where FCA forfeitures were allowed for numerous projects on which no actual pecuniary loss had been incurred, the government’s “injuries, of course, included not merely the amount of the fraud itself, but also ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation, that routinely attend the Government’s efforts to root out deceptive practices directed at the public purse.”
- holding that “a defendant who has already been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as deterrent or retribution,” given the constitutional protection against double jeopardy
- holding that the imposition of a civil penalty of $2,000 per claim plus twice the government’s actual damages and costs against an individual who was previously convicted of submitting 65 false claims to the government constitutes “punishment” for purposes of double jeopardy
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)
Listed in the Constitution Annotated's table of Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision (entry 216, expressly overruled).
Overruled by Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994)
The Hudson case, which was decided after Kurth Ranch, overruled United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), a decision relied upon by the Kurth Ranch majority.
Abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996)
490 U.S. 435, 451 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996).
Criticized by Ex Parte State Alcoholic Bev. Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1149 (1994)
[2] The Halper rule itself has been criticized by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
Criticized by Barlett v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 1994 Ala. LEXIS 460 (1994)
The Halper rule itself has been criticized by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas.
Declined to follow by Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. United States, 36 Cont. Cas. Fed. 75,908 (1990)
In light of the Supreme Court’s admonition that Halper should be limited to its facts, the court declines plaintiffs invitation to extend Halper to the present case.
and 2 more.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Gelinas v. Town of West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265 (2001)
Furthermore, Halper is distinguishable because in this case there was no evidence before the trial court of the expenses incurred by the town in pursuing the violations from June, 1987, until January 4, 1995, the date when the court denied the plaintiffs motion to set aside its June 16, 1994 judgment.
Distinguished by Doehling v. State, 225 Ga. App. 760 (1997)
Halper is inapposite; it does not address the double jeopardy issue raised by the facts here.
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 454 Pa. Super. 93 (1996)
In reaching this determination, the Supreme Court emphasized that its decision in Halper was limited to the context of civil penalties and was inapplicable to cases involving civil forfeiture proceedings, quoting the following language from Halper:
Distinguished by City of Helena v. Danichek, 277 Mont. 461 (1996)
We distinguished Halper by noting that in that case Halper’s conduct violated two separate laws — one criminal and one civil — and the government sought to enforce both in separate proceedings.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court and write only to discuss the limits of today’s holding. As the Court points out, our holding will not undermine the Government’s efforts to enforce the laws effectively, since appropriate alternatives remain to ensure the Government’s ability to make full use of the sanctions authorized by statute. Ante, at 450-451. Our rule permits the imposition in the ordinary case of at least a fixed penalty roughly proportionate to the damage caused or a rea *453 sonably liquidated amount, plus double damages. Ante, at 449.
Today’s holding, I would stress, constitutes an objective rule that is grounded in the nature of the sanction and the facts of the particular case. It does not authorize courts to undertake a broad inquiry into the subjective purposes that may be thought to lie behind a given judicial proceeding. Cf. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U. S. 624, 635 (1988); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). Such an inquiry would be amorphous and speculative, and would mire the courts in the quagmire of differentiating among the multiple purposes that underlie every proceeding, whether it be civil or criminal in name. It also would breed confusion among legislators who seek to structure the mechanisms of proper law enforcement within constitutional commands. In approaching the sometimes difficult question whether an enactment constitutes what must be deemed a punishment, we have recognized that a number of objective factors bear on the inquiry. Ibid. In the case before us, I agree with the Court that the controlling circumstance is whether the civil penalty imposed in the second proceeding bears any rational relation to the damages suffered by the Government. Here it does not, so it must be considered punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.