stating that “[s]tatutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers,” and that “[s]ection 1915(d) [of Title 28 of the United States Code], for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”2
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[s]tatutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers,” and that “[s]ection 1915(d) [of Title 28 of the United States Code], for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision”2
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize federal court to require unwilling lawyer to represent indigent litigant in civil case and explaining elaborate plan that Iowa district courts had developed with assistance of state bar and Legal Services Corporation to recruit counsel for representation of indigent persons
- holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not authorize compulsory appointment of 1 Bailey’s Tramadol prescription expired in November 2017. Because Tramadol is a habit-forming synthetic opioid, the prescription was not renewed. ECF No. 16-5 at 3-4. counsel
- concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by American Samoa Government v. Wilson, 23 Am. Samoa 2d 159 (1993)
Counsel’s citation of Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989), is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
concurring.
Our decision today speaks to the interpretation of a statute, to the requirements of the law, and not to the professional responsibility of the lawyer. Lawyers, like all those who practice a profession, have obligations to their calling which exceed their obligations to the State. Lawyers also have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of *311 the court. Accepting a court’s request to represent the indigent is one of those traditional obligations. Our judgment here does not suggest otherwise. To the contrary, it is precisely because our duties go beyond what the law demands that ours remains a noble profession.
I join in full the opinion of the Court.