holding that [i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender” and further explaining that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment action even though they do not “inevitably” prove that fact (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- holding that [i]n the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender” and further explaining that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment action even though they do not “inevitably” prove that fact (emphasis in original)
- holding that Title VII protected a woman who failed to conform to social expectations concerning how a woman should look and behave, establishing that Title VII’s reference to “sex” encompasses both the biological differences between men and women and gender dis-criminations, i.e., discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms
- stating that “stray remarks ... cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers” and that there must be “direct evidence that decisionmak-ers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision”
- finding that “[w]hen, therefore, an employer considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a decision, that decision was ‘because of sex and the other, legitimate considerations-even if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into account.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994) — not on the Supreme Court's list
490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003) — not on the Supreme Court's list
490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84, and the pretext method set forth in
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Burrage v. United States — not on the Supreme Court's list
490 U.S. 228 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Landgraf v. Usi Film Prods. (1994) 511 U.S. 244
Supreme Court of the United StatesJan 27, 201425 citing opinionsby statuteother groundsunconfirmed confidenceRead itQuestioned by O'Brien v. Telcordia Technologies, 420 N.J. Super. 256 (2011)
In that case, the Court held that the burden-shifting framework of Price Waterhouse was inapplicable to claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 621 to § 634.
Questioned by Bertolotti v. AutoZone, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 590 (2015)
analyzing claims under the ADEA has changed from the burden shifting analysis to a but-for causation requirement where there are allegations of direct evidence, that standard has not yet been applied to NJLAD claims); O’Brien v. Telcordia Tech., Inc., 420 N.J.Super. 256, 20 A.3d 1154, 1163 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.2011) (explaining that "we defer a decision on the thorny issue of the continued viability of the use of a…
Questioned by Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)
Finally, we reject petitioner’s contention that our interpretation of the ADEA is controlled by Price Waterhouse, which initially established that the burden of persuasion shifted in alleged mixed-motives Title VII claims.5 In any event, it is far from clear that the Court would have the same approach were it to consider the question today in the first
Distinguished
Distinguished by Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Haw. 1 (2015)
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), the Court stated that Bur-dine is inapplicable to prove sex discrimination when the employer's motive was a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate reasons.
Distinguished by Johnson v. Benton County School District, 926 F. Supp. 2d 899 (2013)
Gross involved an ADEA claim, and the Supreme Court held that the Price Waterhouse framework was inapplicable to such claims for two reasons.
Distinguished by Matthews v. City of New York, 270 A.D.2d 45 (2000)
Absent a prima facie showing of discrimination, the mixed-motive analysis of Price Waterhouse v Hopkins (490 US 228) is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen, Local 201, 170 F.3d 1111 (1999)
Second, the class argues that the Hopkins case is distinguishable because it wás the liability phase of a mixed-motives ease, not the damages phase of a class action suit.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
In my view, to determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look only to the Court’s opinion in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a public employee was not rehired, in part *259 because of his exercise of First Amendment rights and in part because of permissible considerations. The Court rejected a rule of causation that focused “solely on whether protected conduct played a part, ‘substantial’ or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,” on the grounds that such a rule could make the employee better off by exercising his constitutional rights than by doing nothing at all. Id., at 285 . Instead, the Court outlined the following approach:
“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ — or, to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id., at 287 (footnote omitted).
It is not necessary to get into semantic discussions on whether the Mt. Healthy approach is “but-for” causation in another guise or creates an affirmative defense on the part of the employer to see its clear application to the issues before us in this case. As in Mt. Healthy, the District Court found that the employer was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors. And here, as in Mt. Healthy, and as the Court now holds, Hopkins was not required to prove that the illegitimate factor was the only, principal, or true reason for petitioner’s action. Rather, as Justice O’Connor states, her burden was to show that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. The District Court, as its opinion was construed by the Court of Appeals, so found, 263 U. S. App. D. C. 321, 333, 334, 825 F. 2d 458, 470, 471 (1987), and I agree that the finding was supported by the record. The burden of persuasion then *260 should have shifted to Price Waterhouse to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision ... in the absence of” the unlawful motive. Mt. Healthy, supra, at 287 .
I agree with Justice Brennan that applying this approach to causation in Title VII cases is not a departure from, and does not require modification of, the Court’s holdings in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U. S. 248 (1981), and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973). The Court has made clear that “mixed-motives” cases, such as the present one, are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine . In pretext cases, “the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the ‘true’ motives behind the decision.” NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U. S. 393, 400, n. 5 (1983). In mixed-motives cases, however, there is no one “true” motive behind the decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate. It can hardly be said that our decision in this case is a departure from cases that are “inapposite.” Ibid. 1 also disagree with the dissent’s assertion that this approach to causation is inconsistent with our statement in Burdine that “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” 450 U. S., at 253 . As we indicated in Transportation Management Corp., the showing required by Mt. Healthy does not improperly shift from the plaintiff the ultimate burden of persuasion on whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against him or her. See 462 U. S., at 400, n. 5 .
Because the Court of Appeals required Price Waterhouse to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the improper motive, rather than merely requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence as in Mt. Healthy, I concur in the judgment reversing this case in part and remanding. *261 With respect to the employer’s burden, however, the plurality seems to require, at least in most cases, that the employer submit objective evidence that the same result would have occurred absent the unlawful motivation. Ante, at 252. In my view, however, there is no special requirement that the employer carry its burden by objective evidence. In a mixed-motives case, where the legitimate motive found would have been ample grounds for the action taken, and the employer credibly testifies that the action would have been taken for the legitimate reasons alone, this should be ample proof. This would even more plainly be the case where the employer denies any illegitimate motive in the first place but the court finds that illegitimate, as well as legitimate, factors motivated the adverse action. *
I agree with the plurality that if the employer carries this burden, there has been no violation of Title VII.