holding that "the Government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, ‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search' ” and further explaining that because "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, ... blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances *92 were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.... [As a result,] the delay necessary to procure a warrant ... may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that "the Government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement is at its strongest when, as here, ‘the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search' ” and further explaining that because "alcohol and other drugs are eliminated from the bloodstream at a constant rate, ... blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances *92 were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.... [As a result,] the delay necessary to procure a warrant ... may result in the destruction of valuable evidence.”
- holding, in discussing required disclosure to Government of medical information, “[wjhile this procedure permits the Government to learn certain private medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose, there is no indication that the Government does not treat this information as confidential, or that it uses this information for any other purpose. Under the circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a significant invasion of privacy.”
- holding, in discussing required disclosure to Government of medical information, “[w]hile this procedure permits the Government to learn certain private medical facts that an employee might prefer not to disclose, there is no indication that the Government does not treat this information as confidential, or that it uses this information for any other purpose. Under the circumstances, we do not view this procedure as a significant invasion of privacy.”
- holding that “[w]e have long recognized that a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.... This physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” (internal quotation marks, citations, & some alterations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Commonwealth v. Danforth, 395 Pa. Super. 1 (1990)
We refuse to extend the holding of Skinner to the context of a criminal investigation of a driving under the influence case.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
In my opinion the public interest in determining the causes of serious railroad accidents adequately supports the validity of the challenged regulations. I am not persuaded, however, that the interest in deterring the use of alcohol or drugs is either necessary or sufficient to justify the searches authorized by these regulations.
I think it a dubious proposition that the regulations significantly deter the use of alcohol and drugs by hours of service employees. Most people — and I would think most railroad employees as well — do not go to work with the expectation that they may be involved in a major accident, particularly one causing such catastrophic results as loss of life or the release of hazardous material requiring an evacuation. Moreover, even if they are conscious of the possibilities that such an accident might occur and that alcohol or drug use might be a contributing factor, if the risk of serious personal injury does not deter their use of these substances, it seems highly unlikely that the additional threat of loss of employment would have any effect on their behavior.
*635 For this reason, I do not join the portions of Part III of the Court’s opinion that rely on a deterrence rationale; I do, however, join the balance of the opinion and the Court’s judgment.