reasoning that "as we stated in Daniel ..., which held that Taylor was not to be given retroactive effect, the fair cross section requirement does not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial, is necessarily unfair because it is not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment,” and concluding that rule extending fair cross section requirement to petit jury would not be “bedrock procedural element” retroactively applied under second Teague exception (internal quotations and alterations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- reasoning that "as we stated in Daniel ..., which held that Taylor was not to be given retroactive effect, the fair cross section requirement does not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial, is necessarily unfair because it is not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment,” and concluding that rule extending fair cross section requirement to petit jury would not be “bedrock procedural element” retroactively applied under second Teague exception (internal quotations and alterations omitted)
- holding with respect to collateral challenges to criminal convictions that "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure [announced in case law] will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced," and explaining that "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final"
- holding that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review unless a new rule (1) "places 'certain kinds of primary, individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,' " or (2) "requires the observance of 'those procedures that ... are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty ... " ' "
- stating that such rules are “best illustrated by recalling the classic grounds for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus—that the proceeding was dominated by mob violence; that the prosecutor knowingly made use of perjured testimony or that the conviction was based on a confession extorted from the defendant by brutal methods”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled in part by Edwards v. Vannoy, 593 U.S. 255 (2021) — not on the Supreme Court's list
103 L Ed 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion by O’Connor, J.), abrogated in part by Edwards v Vannoy, 593 US 255, 271-272
Questioned by United States v. Darius M. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (2001)
sent suggests, based on dictum in Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), that cause may be shown where a new constitutional rule overturns “a longstanding and widespread practice to which [the Supreme Court] has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved.”11 The vitality of Reed has been questioned following the Supreme Court’s decisions in…
Criticized by United States v. Castro-Taveras, 841 F.3d 34 (2016)
Indeed, the Teague standard requiring that a holding be “dictated” for it to be considered an old rule, id. has been criticized by legal scholars as excessively harsh and impossible to satisfy.
Disagreed with by Eugene Williams Gall, Jr. v. Phil Parker, Warden, 231 F.3d 265 (2000)
We disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument that Teague bars the retroactive application of these holdings.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Green v. Georgia, 51 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (2014)
In addition, the Court notes that to the extent retroactivity is an issue, the proscriptions of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), are inapposite.
Distinguished by Green v. Georgia, 987 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (2013)
In addition, the Court notes that to the extent retroactivity is an issue, the proscriptions of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), are inapposite.
Distinguished by United States v. Ruiz-Romero, 521 F. App'x 680 (2013)
489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), is inapplicable to ineffective-assistance claims and to § 2255 motions.
Distinguished by Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182 (2011)
In short, as the Supreme Court has instructed, Teague's anti-retroactivity principle "is inapplicable to the situation in which this Court decides the meaning of a criminal statute enacted by Congress.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join Parts I, II, and III of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. Otherwise, I concu,r only in the judgment.
*317 Our opinion in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297 (1967), authored by Justice Brennan, articulated a three-factor formula for determining the retroactivity of decisions changing the constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The formula, which applied whether a case was on direct review or arose in collateral proceedings, involved consideration of the purpose of the new rule, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new rule. In a series of cases, however, the Court has departed from Stovall and has held that decisions changing the governing rules in criminal cases will be applied retroactively to all cases then pending on direct review, e. g., United States v. Johnson, 457 U. S. 537 (1982); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U. S. 51 (1985); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 (1987). I dissented in those cases, believing that Stovall was the sounder approach. Other Justices, including the Chief Justice and Justice O’Connor, joined my dissents in those cases. The Chief Justice indicated in Shea and Griffith , and Justice O’Connor has now concluded, that the Stovall formula should also be abandoned in cases where convictions have become final and the issue of retroactivity arises in collateral proceedings.
I regret the course the Court has taken to this point, but cases like Johnson, Shea, and Griffith have been decided, and I have insufficient reason to continue to object to them. In light of those decisions, the result reached in Parts IV and V of Justice O’Connor’s opinion is an acceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theories embraced by the Court in cases dealing with direct review, and I concur in that result. If we are wrong in construing the reach of the habeas corpus statutes, Congress can of course correct us; but because the Court’s recent decisions dealing with direct review appear to have constitutional underpinnings, see e. g., Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, at 322-323 , correction of our error, if error there is, perhaps lies with us, not Congress.