stating that "a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding” because the independent and adequate state ground doctrine "curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on federal habeas as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision”
How later courts described this case
- stating that "a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding” because the independent and adequate state ground doctrine "curtails reconsideration of the federal issue on federal habeas as long as the state court explicitly invokes a state procedural bar rule as a separate basis for decision”
- holding adequate and independent finding of procedural bar will bar federal habeas review of federal claim unless habeas petition can show "cause” for default and "prejudice attributable thereto” or demonstrate that failure to consider federal claim will result in "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
- stating that "where a claim raised on federal habeas has never been presented to the state courts at all, . . . federal courts quite properly look to, and apply, state procedural default rules in making the congressionally mandated determination whether adequate remedies are available in state court"
- holding that a “procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim ... unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that is judgment rests on a procedural bar.” (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Owens v. Treder, 873 F.2d 604 (1989)
The majority's citation to the principle underlying Harris v. Reed, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989) is inapposite because the statements used here are not ambiguous.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
In view of my dissent in Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1065-1072 (1983), it is appropriate to add a few words explaining why there is unique virtue in applying the rule of that case to the problem presented by this case.
My dissent in Michigan v. Long was addressed primarily to two concerns. First, in adopting a presumption favoring the assertion of federal jurisdiction in ambiguous cases, the Court ignored the longstanding and venerated presumption *267 that federal courts are without jurisdiction unless “ ‘the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 692 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting King Bridge Co. v. Otoe County, 120 U. S. 225, 226 (1887)). Second, in its original form, the presumption adopted in Michigan v. Long expanded this Court’s review of cases in which state courts had overprotected their respective citizens. In my opinion, the federal courts — and •particularly this Court — have a primary obligation to protect the rights of the individual that are embodied in the Federal Constitution. See 475 U. S., at 695-697 . Although some cases involving overly expansive interpretations of federally protected rights surely merit federal review, the interest in correcting such errors is necessarily secondary to the federal courts’ principal role as protector of federally secured rights. The expenditure of scarce judicial resources and the intrusion into state affairs is accordingly less justified when the state court has gone too far in protecting a federal right than when the state court has failed to provide the constitutional minimum of protection.
These concerns, however, are not implicated in a case such as this, in which a federal court, in considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, must decide whether a state procedural bar constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for denying relief. As our decisions in Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 426-435 (1963), and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S. 72, 82-84 (1977), make clear, an adequate and independent state ground for decision does not dispossess the federal courts of jurisdiction on collateral review. More significantly, in considering petitions for relief under 28 U. S. C. § 2254 , the federal courts do not review state-court decisions to determine if the States have gone too far in protecting the rights of their citizenry, but rather perform the core function of vindicating federally protected rights. Because the concerns that prevented me from joining the majority opinion in *268 Michigan v. Long are not present in this case, I join the Court’s opinion and judgment.