finding that California’s restrictions on the organization and composition of official governing bodies violated the parties’ associational rights because the restrictions “limit[ed] a political party’s discretion in how to organize itself, conduct its affairs, and select its leaders”
How later courts described this case
- finding that California’s restrictions on the organization and composition of official governing bodies violated the parties’ associational rights because the restrictions “limit[ed] a political party’s discretion in how to organize itself, conduct its affairs, and select its leaders”
- recognizing that the state’s interests in a stable government and protecting voters from confusion were compelling or at least legitimate interests, but finding these interests insufficient to justify California’s ban on primary endorsements by political parties
- recognizing that the First Amendment, while guaranteeing associational rights, does not bar “intervention ... necessary to prevent the dero gation of the civil rights of party adherents”
- concluding that it was clearly established that the employee’s opposition to his employer’s candidacy and his support of another person’s was protected by the First Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring.
Today the Court relies on its opinion in Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 183-185 (1979) — and, in particular, on a portion of that opinion that .1 did not join — for its formulation of the governing standards in election cases. In that case Justice Blackmun explained his acceptance of the Court’s approach in words that precisely express my views about this case. He wrote:
“Although I join the Court’s opinion . . . , I add these comments to record purposefully, and perhaps somewhat belatedly, my unrelieved discomfort with what *234 seems to be a continuing tendency in this Court to use as tests such easy phrases as ‘compelling [state] interest’ and ‘least drastic [or restrictive] means.’ See, ante, at 184, 185, and 186. I have never been able fully to appreciate just what a ‘compelling state interest’ is. If it means ‘convincingly controlling,’ or ‘incapable of being overcome’ upon any balancing process, then, of course, the test merely announces an inevitable result, and the test is no test at all. And, for me, ‘least drastic means’ is a slippery slope and also the signal of the result the Court has chosen to reach. A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to vote to strike legislation down. This is reminiscent of the Court’s indulgence, a few decades ago, in substantive due process in the economic area as a means of nullification.
“I feel, therefore, and have always felt, that these phrases are really not very helpful for constitutional analysis. They are too convenient and result oriented, and I must endeavor to disassociate myself from them. Apart from their use, however, the result the Court reaches here is the correct one. It is with these reservations that I join the Court’s opinion.” Id., at 188-189 .
With those same reservations I join the Court’s opinion today.