recognizing that the Due Process Clause is "phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security" and thus concluding that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the Due Process Clause is "phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security" and thus concluding that "our cases have recognized that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual"
- explaining “the State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him shelter,” and reasoning that simply because “the State once took temporary custody of [of a minor child pending investigation of suspected child abuse] does not alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father’s custody, it placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had it not acted at all”
- explaining that the Due Process Clause "forbids the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without 'due process of law,' but its language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from each other."
- holding that “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf — through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty — which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not its failure to act to protect his liberty interest against harms by other means”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 74 F.3d 633 (1996)
The Court’s later decision in DeShaney, however, called into question the constitutional significance of this premise.
Criticized by In the Matter of McKnight, 406 Mass. 787 (1990)
The DeShaney opinion has been criticized for failing to recognize, and to give effect to, the significant role the State of Wisconsin played by omission in the harm that came to Joshua DeShaney.
Declined to follow by Brodie v. Summit County Children Services Board, 51 Ohio St. 3d 112 (1990)
Having considered DeShaney and the federal cases leading to its decision, we decline to adopt the doctrine of absolute immunity as applied in Section 1983 cases against a political subdivision claiming deprivation of due process of law.
Disagreed with by Pinder v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 368 (1994)
We disagree with this interpretation and application of the Court’s holding in DeShaney.
Limited by Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723 (2004)
We disagree with that view of the law and hold that DeShaney-type liability can only be imposed "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (2016)
Defendants argue the DeShaney exceptions are inapplicable when the actor is the federal government rather than a state government.
Distinguished by Kaho'ohanohano ex rel. Morales-Kaho'ohanohano v. Department of Human Services, 117 Haw. 262 (2008)
However, as pointed out by the Kaho'ohanohanos, DeShaney is inapplicable because that case dealt with constitutional violations.
Distinguished by Kahoohanohano v. DHS, STATE, 178 P.3d 538 (2008)
However, as pointed out by the Kaho`ohanohanos, DeShaney is inapplicable because that case dealt with constitutional violations.
Distinguished by Suffolk Parents Of Handicapped Adults v. Wingate, 101 F.3d 818 (1996)
Id. We further concluded that Society for Good Will was distinguishable, because in that case the State's obligation to provide some quantum of care and funding was undisputed.
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
dissenting.
Today, the Court purports to be the dispassionate oracle of the law, unmoved by "natural sympathy.” Ante, at 202. But, in this pretense, the Court itself retreats into a sterile formalism which prevents it from recognizing either the facts of the case before it or the legal norms that should apply to those facts. As Justice Brennan demonstrates, the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney — intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed.
The Court fails to recognize this duty because it attempts to draw a sharp and rigid line between action and inaction. But such formalistic reasoning has no place in the interpretation of the broad and stirring Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, I submit that these Clauses were designed, at least in part, to undo the formalistic legal reasoning that infected antebellum jurisprudence, which the late Professor Robert Cover analyzed so effectively in his significant work entitled Justice Accused (1975).
Like the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves, see id., at 119-121, the Court today claims that its decision, however harsh, is compelled by existing legal doctrine. On the contrary, the question presented by this case *213 is an open one, and our Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how one chooses to read them. Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be exiled from the province of judging. Cf. A. Stone, Law, Psychiatry, and Morality 262 (1984) (“We will make mistakes if we go forward, but doing nothing can be the worst mistake. What is required of us is moral ambition. Until our composite sketch becomes a true portrait of humanity we must live with our uncertainty; we will grope, we will struggle, and our compassion may be our only guide and comfort”).
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible, bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, ante, at 193, “dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files.” It is a sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles — so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about “liberty and justice for all”— that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded. Joshua and his mother, as petitioners here, deserve — but now are denied by this Court — the opportunity to have the facts of their case considered in the light of the constitutional protection that 42 U. S. C. § 1983 is meant to provide.