stating that under U.S. Supreme Court case law "'the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness," (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105), and "that 'a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate eross-exami-nation designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness," (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that under U.S. Supreme Court case law "'the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness," (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105), and "that 'a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate eross-exami-nation designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness," (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431) (additional internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that the petitioner’s confrontation rights were violated, and that, under Van Arsdall, the violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, where it concerned the limitation of cross-examination of the prosecution’s key witness, and the only other corroborating evidence was substantially questionable
- holding the trial court erred when it excluded evidence of a rape victim’s relationship with another man when evidence of that relationship would have provided strong evidence of her motive to lie about being raped and there was no alternative evidence that would have tended to show the same
- holding that a court's refusal to allow a defendant to introduce evidence revealing the prosecuting witness' sexual relationship with her boyfriend to show her motive to falsely accuse the defendant of rape violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to mount a defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Micah Harris v. M. Martel, 461 F. App'x 602 (2011)
488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988) (per curiam), the case on which Harris relies, is easily distinguishable.
Distinguished by State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006)
While Gregory argues that we must overturn Hudlow in light of Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988), that case discusses a defendant's right to present relevant evidence regarding the victim's motive to lie, id. at 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, not a right to present irrelevant evidence.
Distinguished by State v. Rosborough, 62 Wash. App. 341 (1991)
488 U.S. 227, 102 L. Ed. 2d 513, 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988), cited by Rosborough, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
I continue to believe that summary dispositions deprive litigants of a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits and create a significant risk that the Court is rendering an erroneous or ill-advised decision that may confuse the lower courts. See Pennsylvania v. Bruder, ante, p. 11 (Mar *234 shall, J., dissenting); Rhodes v. Stewart, ante, p. 4 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U. S. 265, 269 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U. S. 3, 7 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting). I therefore dissent from the Court’s decision today to reverse summarily the decision below.