stating in passing that the Court is unwilling to read the due process clause to “impos[e] on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution,” and that “the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”
How later courts described this case
- stating in passing that the Court is unwilling to read the due process clause to “impos[e] on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution,” and that “the police do not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests”
- explaining that the difference in treatment stems in part from the Court’s “unwillingness to read the ‘fundamental fairness’ requirement of the Due Process Clause ... as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution”
- stating that based on the state’s inadvertent destruction of certain evidence, the trial court’s instruction that the jury could infer this evidentiary fact against the prosecution, “the uncertainty as to what the evidence might have proved [in Mr. Youngblood’s case] was turned to [his] advantage”
- holding that, absent showing of bad faith, failure on the part of police to preserve potentially useful evidence "of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant” does not constitute a denial of due process
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Michael R. Luedtke, 362 Wis. 2d 1 (2015)
Judge Reilly argued Youngblood was inapplicable in the present case because Weissinger's blood sample had inculpatory value, not merely "conceivable evidentiary significance.
Distinguished by Thomas Cress v. Carmen Palmer, Warden, Riverside Correctional Facility, 484 F.3d 844 (2007)
488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), the leading cases on this issue, were inapplicable in this case because both
Distinguished by People v. Anstey, 476 Mich. 436 (2006)
Youngblood is distinguishable because it involves the government’s failure to disclose existing evidence in its possession, where the instant case involves defendant’s right to develop potentially exculpatory evidence not in the government’s possession.24 For due process purposes, there is a crucial distinction between failing to disclose evidence that has been develo
Distinguished by State v. Geeslin, Unpublished Decision (3-20-2006), 2006 Ohio 1261 (2006)
Accordingly, the analysis used by the Supreme Court in Youngblood for "potentially useful" evidence is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in the judgment.
Three factors are of critical importance to my evaluation of this case. First, at the time the police failed to refrigerate the victim’s clothing, and thus negligently lost potentially valuable evidence, they had at least as great an interest in preserving the evidence as did the person later accused of the crime. Indeed, at that time it was more likely that the evidence would have been useful to the police — who were still conducting an investigation — and to the prosecutor — who would later bear the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt — than to the defendant. In cases such as this, even without a prophylactic sanction such as dismissal of the indictment, the State has a strong incentive to preserve the evidence.
Second, although it is not possible to know whether the lost evidence would have revealed any relevant information, it is unlikely that the defendant was prejudiced by the State’s omission. In examining witnesses and in her summation, defense counsel impressed upon the jury the fact that the State failed to preserve the evidence and that the State could have conducted tests that might well have exonerated the defendant. See App. to Pet. for Cert. C21-C38, C42-C45; 9 Tr. 183-202, 207-208; 10 Tr. 58-61, 69-70. More significantly, the trial judge instructed the jury: “If you find that the State has . . . allowed to be destroyed or lost any evidence whose *60 content or quality are in issue, you may infer that the true fact is against the State’s interest.” 10 Tr. 90. As a result, the uncertainty as to what the evidence might have proved was turned to the defendant’s advantage.
Third, the fact that no juror chose to draw the permissive inference that proper preservation of the evidence would have demonstrated that the defendant was not the assailant suggests that the lost evidence was “immaterial.” Our cases make clear that “[t]he proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt,” and that a State’s failure to turn over (or preserve) potentially exculpatory evidence therefore “must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 (1976) (footnotes omitted); see also California v. Trombetta, 467 U. S. 479, 488 (1984) (duty to preserve evidence “must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense”). In declining defense counsel’s and the court’s invitations to draw the permissive inference, the jurors in effect indicated that, in their view, the other evidence at trial was so overwhelming that it was highly improbable that the lost evidence was exculpatory. In Trombetta , this Court found no due process violation because “the chances [were] extremely low that preserved [breath] samples would have been exculpatory.” Id., at 489 . In this case, the jury has already performed this calculus based on its understanding of the evidence introduced at trial. Presumably, in a case involving a closer question as to guilt or innocence, the jurors would have been more ready to infer that the lost evidence was exculpatory.
With these factors in mind, I concur in the Court’s judgment. I do not, however, join the Court’s opinion because it announces a proposition of law that is much broader than necessary to decide this case. It states that “unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a *61 denial of due process of law.” Ante, at 58. In my opinion, there may well be cases in which the defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal trial fundamentally unfair. This, however, is not such a case. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment.