explaining that “[w]hen Congress enacted the APA to provide a general authorization for review of agency action in the district courts, it did not intend that general grant of jurisdiction to duplicate the previously established special statutory procedures relating to specific agencies,” such as statutes setting out that "Federal Trade Commission and National Labor Relations Board orders were directly reviewable in the regional courts of appeals, and Interstate Commerce Commission orders were subject to review in specially constituted three judge district courts.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[w]hen Congress enacted the APA to provide a general authorization for review of agency action in the district courts, it did not intend that general grant of jurisdiction to duplicate the previously established special statutory procedures relating to specific agencies,” such as statutes setting out that "Federal Trade Commission and National Labor Relations Board orders were directly reviewable in the regional courts of appeals, and Interstate Commerce Commission orders were subject to review in specially constituted three judge district courts.”
- finding that the APA's sovereign immunity provision did not bar judicial review of a suit seeking to enforce Medicaid's reimbursement provisions because it "is not a suit seeking money in compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as mandated; rather it is a suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate itself,which happens to be one for the payment of money"
- holding that a district court could hear a claim for an injunction requiring the government to pay certain Medicaid reimbursements because it was "a suit seeking to enforce the statutory mandate itself, which happens to be one for the payment of money," and "not a suit seeking money in compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay"
- stating in dicta that “[o]ur cases have long recognized the distinction between an action at law for damages — which are intended to provide a victim with monetary compensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation — and an equitable action for specific relief — which may include an order providing for ... ejectment from land .... ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 1308 (2020)
But Bowen is distinguishable on several scores.
Distinguished by Batsche v. Burwell, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1130 (2016)
The Trustees rely heavily on Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), but Bowen is easily distinguishable.
Distinguished by Passamaquoddy Tribe v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 256 (2008)
For example, the court again concludes that the distinctions drawn between specific monetary relief and money damages in Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 901, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988), are inapposite to the § 1500 analysis, for the reasons stated in Tohono O’od-ham I, 79 Fed.Cl. at 658 & n. 14.
Distinguished by District of Columbia v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 292 (2005)
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1386 (Fed.Cir.2001) (Con Ed II).9 The revised opinion in Con Ed II held that Bowen was distinguishable from Con Ed II; that jurisdiction for the type of relief claimed in Con Ed II lies in the Court of Federal Claims; and that this court’s adequate remedy ousted APA jurisdiction in the district court pursuant to section 704.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
The Court construes the District Court’s orders as not having entered a judgment for money damages within the meaning of 5 U. S. C. § 702 . I am prepared to accept that view of what the District Court did, although the Court of Appeals had a different view.
The Court’s opinion, as I understand it, also concludes that the District Court, in the circumstances present here, would have had jurisdiction to entertain and expressly grant a prayer for a money judgment against the United States. I am unprepared to agree with this aspect of the opinion and hence concur only in the result the Court reaches with respect to the construction of § 702.
*913 The Court is correct in holding that § 704 does not bar District Court review of the challenged orders, the reason being that the Claims Court could not entertain and grant the claims presented to and granted by the District Court. I thus agree with the result reached in Part III of the Court’s opinion.