holding that even assuming, arguendo, that charitable solicitations were “in the abstract ... merely ‘commercial,’ we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with ... fully protected speech” on issues of public importance such as those described in Schaumburg, and therefore declining to “separate the component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole”
How later courts described this case
- holding that even assuming, arguendo, that charitable solicitations were “in the abstract ... merely ‘commercial,’ we do not believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined with ... fully protected speech” on issues of public importance such as those described in Schaumburg, and therefore declining to “separate the component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole”
- holding that a law aimed at preventing fraud by requiring professional fundraisers to disclose the percentage of charitable contributions collected during the previous year that were actually turned over to charity is not narrowly tailored partly because a state “may vigorously enforce its antifraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false pretenses or by making false statements”
- holding that regulation requiring professional fund raisers to disclose to its audience that portion of the annual funds actually given to charity was subject to the test for fully protected expression, not the more deferential commercial speech principles, as the commercial portions of the speech were inextricably intertwined with the protected portions
- holding unconstitutional state requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to prospective donors factual information concerning the percentage of contributions actually passed on to charities notwithstanding the fact that prospective donors might find the *74 truthful information relevant and persuasive
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth ex rel. Preate v. Cancer Fund of America, Inc., 153 Pa. Commw. 124 (1993)
The licensing scheme at issue in Riley is distinguishable from Pennsylvania’s requirements in that all solicitors in the Riley case were required to submit license applications.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part.
Although I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court’s opinion, I agree with The Chief Justice that the licensing provisions in the North Carolina statute do not impose a significant burden on the charities’ ability to speak and that there is no evidence suggesting that the State will be dilatory in the processing of license applications. Thus, I respectfully dissent from Part IV of the Court’s opinion.