finding no excessive entanglement in religion resulted from the Department of Health and Human Services' monitoring of federal grants to private organizations that provided counseling in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy, even when the grantee was a religious organization, because the federal financial aid did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
How later courts described this case
- finding no excessive entanglement in religion resulted from the Department of Health and Human Services' monitoring of federal grants to private organizations that provided counseling in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy, even when the grantee was a religious organization, because the federal financial aid did not have the primary effect of advancing religion
- holding constitutional on its face the Adolescent Family Life Act—an act providing grants to religious and other institutions giving counseling on teenage sexuality, without expressly requiring that the funds not be used for religious purposes—but remanding for a determination of the act’s constitutionality as applied
- concluding that monitoring of government grants given to nonprofit organizations that provide educational services did not amount to excessive entanglement because religiously affiliated organizations that may receive government funding are not “pervasively sectarian”
- holding that activities such as “adoption counseling and referral services” were not “specifically religious activities” and were “not converted into such activities by the fact that they [were] carried out by organizations with religious affiliations”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring.
This litigation raises somewhat unusual questions involving a facially valid statute that appears to have been administered in a way that led to violations of the Establishment Clause. I agree with the Court’s resolution of those questions, and I join its opinion. I write separately, however, to explain why I do not believe that the Court’s approach reflects any tolerance for the kind of improper administration that seems to have occurred in the Government program at issue here.
The dissent says, and I fully agree, that “[pjublic funds may not be used to endorse the religious message.” Post, at *623 642'. As the Court notes, “there is no dispute that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible behavior by AFLA grantees.” Ante, at 620. Because the District Court employed an analytical framework that did not require a detailed discussion of the voluminous record, the extent of this impermissible behavior and the degree to which it is attributable to poor administration by the Executive Branch is somewhat less clear. In this circumstance, two points deserve to be emphasized. First, any use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause. Second, extensive violations — if they can be proved in this case — will be highly relevant in shaping an appropriate remedy that ends such abuses. For that reason, appellees may yet prevail on remand, and I do not believe that the Court’s approach entails a relaxation of “the unwavering vigilance that the Constitution requires against any law ‘respecting an establishment of religion.’” See post, at 648 (quoting U. S. Const., Arndt. 1); cf. post, at 63.0, n. 4.
The need' for detailed factual findings by the District Court stems in part from the delicacy of the task given to the Executive Branch by the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA). Government has a strong and legitimate secular interest in encouraging sexual restraint among young people. At the same time, as the dissent rightly points out, “[t]here is a very real and important difference between running a soup kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the difficult decisions facing them.” Post, at 64L Using religious organizations to advance the secular goals of the AFLA, without thereby permitting religious indoctrination, is inevitably more difficult than in other projects, such as ministering to the poor and the sick. I nonetheless agree with the Court that the partnership between governmental and religious institutions contemplated by the AFLA need not result in constitutional violations, despite an undeniably greater risk than is present in cooperative undertakings that involve less sensitive objectives. If the District Court finds *624 on remand that grants are being made in violation of the Establishment Clause, an appropriate remedy would take into account the history of the program’s administration as well as the extent of any continuing constitutional violations.