holding that state claims against procurement contractors are preempted if “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States”
How later courts described this case
- holding that state claims against procurement contractors are preempted if “(1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States”
- holding that a plaintiff would not be entitled to a new trial, even after the Court of Ap- peals reformulated the relevant defense, “[i]f the evidence presented in the first trial [still] would not suffice . . . to support a jury verdict under the properly formulated defense”
- stating, that where Boyle already went to trial, “[i]f the evidence presented in the first trial would not suffice, as a matter of law, to support a jury verdict under the properly formulated defense,” then judgment could be entered immediately for the contractor
- stating that “when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine— to answer ‘questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken,’ we have a special duty to identify the proper decision-maker before trying to make the proper decision” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 753 (2001)
487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988), is inapposite.
Distinguished by Marilyn Goepel Ronald Goepel v. National Postal Mail Handlers Union, a Division of Liuna, D/B/A Mail Handlers Benefit Plan, 36 F.3d 306 (1994)
First, Boyle is distinguishable from this case because it did not involve the removal of “what purports to be a state law claim” from state court to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
Distinguished by Harduvel v. General Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311 (1989)
Thus, the Florida law inference would undermine the Boyle defense by creating a presumption that it is inapplicable.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should carefully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There are instances of so-called interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial process. 1 But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine — to answer “questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken,” United States v. Gilman, 347 U. S. 507, 511 (1954) — we have a special duty to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper decision.
*532 When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual — whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context — I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress. That is the central message of the unanimous decision in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983); 2 that is why I joined the majority in Schweiker v. Chilicky, ante, p. 412, 3 a case decided only three days ago; and that is why I am so distressed by the majority’s decision today. For in this case, as in United States v. Gilman, supra: “The selection of. that policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.” Id., at 511-513 .
I respectfully dissent.
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of the common-law rules of master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
“[W]e decline to create a new substantive legál liability without legislative aid and as at the common law, because we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating it.” 462 U. S., at 390 (internal quotation omitted).
“Congressional competence at ‘balancing, governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals],’ Bush., 462 U. S., at 389 , is no more questionable in the social welfare context than it is in the civil service context. Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 223-224 (1988).” Ante, at 425.