explaining that the prohibition on targeted picketing “preserves ample alternative channels of communication” because protesters may still “enter [residential] neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even marching[,]” “go door-to-door to proselytize their views” or “distribute literature,” “distribute literature ... through the mails,” and “contact residents by telephone”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the prohibition on targeted picketing “preserves ample alternative channels of communication” because protesters may still “enter [residential] neighborhoods, alone or in groups, even marching[,]” “go door-to-door to proselytize their views” or “distribute literature,” “distribute literature ... through the mails,” and “contact residents by telephone”
- holding in the context of picketing on a matter of public concern that residential streets are traditional public fora. “[U]n-inhibited, robust and wide-open debate on public issues” strikes “at the core of the First Amendment.” Id. at 479, 108 S.Ct. at 2499
- explaining that a speech re- striction is narrowly tailored only “if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808 (1984))
- holding that public streets and sidewalks are the “archetype of a traditional public forum”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice White,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that an ordinance which only forbade picketing before a single residence would not be unconstitutional on its face. If such an ordinance were applied to the kind of picketing that appellees carried out here, it *489 clearly would not be invalid under the First Amendment, for the picketing in this case involved large groups of people, ranging at various times from 11 individuals to more than 40. I am convinced, absent more than this record indicates, that if some single-residence picketing by smaller groups could not be forbidden, the range of possibly unconstitutional application of such an ordinance would not render it substantially overbroad and thus unconstitutional on its face.
This leaves the question, however, whether the ordinance at issue in this case forbids only single-residence picketing. The Court says that the language of the ordinance suggests that it is so limited. But the ordinance forbids “any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town of Brookfield.” Brookfield, Wis., Gen. Code §9.17(2), App. to Juris. Statement A-28. That language could easily be construed to reach not only picketing before a single residence, but also picketing that would deliver the desired message about a particular residence to the neighbors and to other passersby. Arguably, it would also reach picketing that is directed at the residences which are located in entire blocks or in larger residential areas. Indeed, the latter is the more natural reading of the ordinance, which seems to prohibit picketing in any area that is located “before or about” any residence or dwelling in the town, i. e., any picketing that occurs either in front of or anywhere around the residences that are located within the town.
Furthermore, there is ho authoritative construction of this ordinance by the Wisconsin state courts that limits the scope of the proscription. There is, however, the interpretation that has been rendered in this case by both the lower federal courts with jurisdiction over the town whose law is at issue, which we rarely overturn and to which we routinely defer unless there is some fairly compelling argument for not doing so — an established practice that the Court relies on to resolve another aspect of this case. Ante, at 482. As I understand *490 the District Court, it did not accept the construction of the ordinance which is urged here, holding instead that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to meet the town’s stated objectives, but “completely bans all picketing in residential neighborhoods,” 619 F. Supp. 792, 797 (ED Wis. 1985), and is not “a constitutional time, place, and manner regulation of speech in a public forum,” id., at 798 . The panel that heard this case in the Court of Appeals, the opinion of which was of course vacated below, also thought that the question raised by the ordinance concerned the general validity of picketing “in a residential neighborhood,” 807 F. 2d 1339, 1348 (CA7 1986) (emphasis in original), and observed that the ordinance “restricts picketing” in the town “to the commercial strip along West Bluemound Road,” ibid. The dissenting judge also understood the ordinance to have confined the ambit of lawful picketing to “any non-residential area.” Id., at 1356 (Coffey, J., dissenting). Finally, I do not read the briefs filed by appellants in this Court to have argued that the ordinance should be narrowly construed to apply only to single-residence picketing. To the contrary, appellants’ briefs in this Court repeatedly refer to the ordinance as banning all picketing in residential areas. Brief for Appellants 12-13, 13, 41, 42, 43; Reply Brief for Appellants 2, 8.
The Court endorses a narrow construction of the ordinance by relying on the town counsel’s representations, made at oral argument, that the ordinance forbids only single-residence picketing. In light of the view taken by the lower federal courts and the apparent failure of counsel below to press on those courts the narrowing construction that has been suggested here, I have reservations about relying on counsel’s statements as an authoritative statement of the law. It is true that several times in the past the Court, in reaching its decision on the validity of a statute, has relied on what it considered to be reliable and perhaps binding representations made by state and federal officials as to how a particular statute will be enforced. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, *491 317-318 (1974); Ehiert v. United States, 402 U. S. 99, 107 (1971); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore, 341 U. S. 56 (1951). But in none of these cases did the Court accept a suggested limiting construction of a state law that appears to be contrary to the views of the lower federal courts.
There is nevertheless sufficient force in the town counsel’s representations about the reach of the ordinance to avoid application of the overbreadth doctrine in this case, which as we have frequently emphasized is such “strong medicine” that it “has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 613 (1973). In my view, if the ordinance were construed to forbid all picketing in residential neighborhoods, the over-breadth doctrine would render it unconstitutional on its face and hence prohibit its enforcement against those, like appel-lees, who engage in single-residence picketing. At least this would be the case until the ordinance is limited in some authoritative manner. Because the representations made in this Court by the town’s legal officer create sufficient doubts in my mind, however, as to how the ordinance will be enforced by the town or construed by the state courts, I would put aside the overbreadth approach here, sustain the ordinance as applied in this case, which the Court at least does, and await further developments.