Schweiker v. Chilicky

Justice Brennan,

with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.

Respondents are three individuals who, because they are unable to engage in gainful employment as a result of certain disabilities, rely primarily or exclusively on disability benefits awarded under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U. S. C. §423 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), for their support and that of their families. Like hundreds' of thousands of other such recipients, in the early 1980’s they lost this essential source of income following state implementation of a federally mandated “continuing disability review” process (CDR), only to have an administrative law judge (ALJ) ultimately reinstate their benefits after appeal, or to regain them, as respondent James Chilicky did, by filing a new application for benefits. Respondents allege that the initial benefit termination resulted from a variety of unconstitutional actions taken by state and federal officials responsible for administering the CDR program. They further allege, and petitioners do not dispute, that as a result of these deprivations, which lasted from 7 to 19 months, they suffered immediate financial hardship, were unable to purchase food, shelter, and *431 other necessities, and were unable to maintain themselves in even a minimally adequate fashion.

The Court today reaffirms the availability of a federal action for money damages against federal officials charged with violating constitutional rights. See ante, at 421. “‘“[WJhere legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.”’” Ibid, (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 396-397 (1971), in turn quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 684 (1946)). Acknowledging that the trauma respondents and others like them suffered as a result of the allegedly unconstitutional acts of state and federal officials “must surely have gone beyond what anyone of normal sensibilities would wish to see imposed on innocent disabled citizens,” ante, at 428-429, the Court does not for a moment suggest that the retroactive award of benefits to which respondents were always entitled remotely approximates full compensation for such trauma. Nevertheless, it refuses to recognize a Bivens remedy here because the “design of [the disability insurance] program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration.” Ante, at 423.

I agree that in appropriate circumstances we should defer to a congressional decision to substitute alternative relief for a judicially created remedy. Neither the design of Title II’s administrative review process, however, nor the debate surrounding its reform contains any suggestion that Congress meant to preclude recognition of a Bivens action for persons whose constitutional rights are violated by those charged with administering the program, or that Congress viewed this process as an adequate substitute remedy for such violations. Indeed, Congress never mentioned, let alone debated, the desirability of providing a statutory remedy for such constitutional wrongs. Because I believe legislators of *432 “normal sensibilities” would not wish to leave such traumatic injuries unrecompensed, I find it inconceivable that Congress meant by mere silence to bar all redress for such injuries.

I

In response to the escalating costs of the Title II disability insurance, program, Congress enacted legislation in 1980 directing state agencies to review the eligibility of Title II beneficiaries at least once every three years in order to ensure that those receiving benefits continued to qualify for such assistance. Pub. L. 96-265, § 311 (a), 94 Stat. 460 , as amended, 42 U. S. C. §421 (i) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV). Although the CDR program was to take effect January 1, 1982, the then-new administration advanced its starting date to March 1, 1981, and initiated what congressional critics later characterized as a “meat ax approach” to the problem of Social Security fraud. 130 Cong. Rec. 6594 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Alexander); id., at 6595 (remarks of Rep. Anthony). Respondents allege that in the course of their review proceedings, state and federal officials violated their due process rights by judging their eligibility in light of impermissible quotas, disregarding dispositive favorable evidence, selecting biased physicians, purposely using unpublished criteria and rules inconsistent with statutory standards, arbitrarily reversing favorable decisions, and failing impartially to review adverse decisions.

Whatever the merits of these allegations, a question that is not now before us, it is undisputed that by 1984 the CDR program was in total disarray. As the Court recounts, during the three years that followed the inauguration of the program, approximately 200,000 recipients lost their benefits only to have them restored on appeal. See ante, at 416. Just under half of all initial reviews resulted in the termination of benefits, H. R. Rep. No. 98-618, p. 10 (1984), yet nearly two-thirds of those who appealed regained their benefits. 130 Cong. Rec. 6598 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Levin); *433 see also S. Rep. No. 96-466, p. 18 (1984). Typically, appeals took anywhere from 9 to 18 months to process, during which time beneficiaries often lacked sufficient income to purchase necessities and also lost their eligibility for Medicare coverage. 130 Cong. Rec. 25979 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Levin). When Congress enacted the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, approximately 120,000 contested eligibility decisions were pending on appeal, and federal courts had directed the agency to reopen another 100,000, id., at 6588 (remarks of Rep. Conte); several “massive” class actions were pending in the federal courts challenging a number of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) disability review policies and standards, Brief for Petitioners 14; and half the States either refused to comply with those standards or were barred by court orders from doing so, 130 Cong. Rec. 13218-13219 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Cohen); id., at 6598 (remarks of Rep. Levin). Indeed, in April 1984, these debilitating challenges prompted the Secretary of Health and Human Services to call a halt to all further reviews by imposing a temporary, nationwide moratorium.

Chief among the problems Congress identified as contributing to this chaotic state of affairs was SSA’s stringent medical improvement standard, which the agency applied in an adjudicative climate that some characterized as “rigorous,” H. R. Rep. No. 98-618, at 10, and others denounced as “overzealous and callous.” 130 Cong. Rec. 6596 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Fowler). Critics charged that under this strict standard, the agency terminated benefits by erroneously deeming medical impairments “slight” without evaluating the recipients’ actual ability to work, and that the agency eliminated from the benefit rolls many other recipients whose medical condition had not changed at all by simply reevaluating their eligibility under the new, more stringent criteria. H. R. Rep. No. 98-618, at 6-7, 10-11. The harshness of both the standard and the results it produced led various Federal Courts of Appeals and a number of States to reject *434 it, which in turn produced widespread confusion and a near total lack of national uniformity in the administration of the disability insurance program itself.

Congress responded to the CDR crisis by establishing, for the first time, a statutory standard governing disability review. Designed primarily to end the practice of terminating benefits based on nothing more than a reassessment of old evidence under new eligibility criteria, the medical improvement standard permits the agency to terminate benefits only where substantial evidence demonstrates that one of four specific conditions is met. 1 In addition to establishing these substantive eligibility criteria and directing SSA to revise certain others, 2 Congress enacted several procedural re *435 forms in order to protect recipients from future erroneous deprivations and to ensure that the review process itself would operate in a fairer and more humane manner. The most significant of these protections was a provision allowing recipients to elect to continue to receive benefit payments, subject to recoupment in certain circumstances, through appeal to a federal ALJ, the penultimate stage of administrative review. See ante, at 424. 3

II

A

In Bivens itself, we noted that, although courts have the authority to provide redress for constitutional violations in the form of an action for money damages, the exercise of that authority may be inappropriate where Congress has created another remedy that it regards as equally effective, or where “special'factors counse[l] hesitation [even] in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.” 403 U. S., at 396-397 . Among the “special factors” the Court divines today in our prior cases is “an appropriate judicial deference to indications that congressional inaction has not been inadvertent. ” Ante, at 423. Describing congressional attention to the numerous problems the CDR process spawned as “frequent and intense,” ante, at 425, the Court concludes that the very design of that process “suggests that Congress has provided what it *436 considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration.” Ante, at 423. The cases setting forth the “special factors” analysis upon which the Court relies, however, reveal, by way of comparison, both the inadequacy of Title II’s “remedial mechanism” and the wholly inadvertent nature of Congress’ failure to provide any statutory remedy for constitutional injuries inflicted during the course of previous review proceedings.

In Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296 (1983), where we declined to permit an action for damages by enlisted military personnel seeking redress from their superior officers for constitutional injuries, we noted that Congress, in the exercise of its “plenary constitutional authority over the military, has enacted statutes regulating military life, and has established a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life .... The resulting system provides for the review and remedy of complaints and grievances such as [the equal protection claim] presented by respondents.” Id., at 302 . That system not only permits aggrieved military personnel to raise constitutional challenges in administrative proceedings, it authorizes recovery of significant consequential damages, notably retroactive promotions. Id., at 303 . Similarly, in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U. S. 367 (1983), we concluded that, in light of the “elaborate, comprehensive scheme” governing federal employment relations, id., at 385 , recognition of any supplemental judicial remedy for constitutional wrongs was inappropriate. Under that scheme— which Congress has “constructed step-by-step, with careful attention to conflicting policy considerations,” see id., at 388 , over the course of nearly 100 years —“[constitutional challenges . . . are fully cognizable” and prevailing employees are entitled not only to full backpay, but to retroactive promotions, seniority, pay raises, and accumulated leave. Id., at 386, 388 . Indeed, Congress expressly “intended [to] put the employee ‘in the same position he would have been in had the *437 unjustified or erroneous personnel action not taken place.’” Id., at 388 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1062, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1966)). .

It is true that neither the military justice system nor the federal employment relations scheme affords aggrieved parties full compensation for constitutional injuries; nevertheless, the relief provided in both is far more complete than that available under Title II’s review process. Although federal employees may not recover damages for any emotional or dignitary harms they might suffer as a result of a constitutional injury, see Bush, supra, at 372, n. 9 , they, like their military counterparts, are entitled to redress for most economic consequential damages, including, most significantly, consequential damage to their. Government careers. Here, by stark contrast, Title II recipients cannot even raise constitutional challenges to agency action in any of the four tiers of administrative review, see ante, at 424, and if they ultimately prevail on their eligibility claims in those administrative proceedings they can recover no consequential damages whatsoever. The only relief afforded persons unconstitutionally deprived of their disability benefits is retroactive payment of the very benefits they should have received all along. Such an award, of course, fails miserably to compensate disabled persons illegally stripped of the income upon which, in many cases, their very subsistence depends. 4

The inadequacy of this relief is by no means a product of “the inevitable compromises required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program.” Ante, at 429. In Chappell and Bush , we dealt with elaborate administrative systems in which Congress anticipated that federal officials might engage in unconstitutional conduct, and in which *438 it accordingly sought to afford injured persons a form of redress as complete as the Government’s institutional concerns would allow. In the federal employment context, for example, Congress carefully “balanc[ed] governmental efficiency and the rights of employees,” Bush, 462 U. S., at 389 , paying “careful attention to conflicting policy considerations,” id., at 388 , and in the military setting it “established a comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life, taking into account the special patterns that define the military structure.” Chappell, supra, at 302 .

Here, as the legislative history of the 1984 Reform Act makes abundantly clear, Congress did not attempt to achieve a delicate balance between the constitutional rights of Title II beneficiaries on the one hand, and administrative concerns on the other. Rather than fine-tuning “an elaborate remedial scheme that ha[d] been constructed step-by-step” over the better part of a century, Congress confronted a paralyzing breakdown in a vital social program, which it sought to rescue from near-total anarchy. Although the legislative debate surrounding the. 1984 Reform Act is littered with references to “arbitrary,” “capricious,” and “wrongful” terminations of benefits, it is clear that neither Congress nor anyone else identified unconstitutional conduct by state agencies as the cause of this paralysis. Rather, Congress blamed the systemic problems it faced in 1984 on SSA’s determination to control the cost of the disability insurance program by accelerating the CDR process and mandating more restrictive reviews. Legislators explained that, “[b]ecause of the abrupt acceleration of the reviews, . . . [s]tate disability determinations offices were forced to accept a three-fold increase in their workloads,” 136 Cong. Rec. 13241 (1984) (remarks of Sen. Bingaman); yet despite this acceleration, SSA took no steps to “assur[ej that the State agencies had the resources to handle the greatly increased workloads,” id., at 13229 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), and instead put “pressure upon *439 [those] agencies to make inaccurate and unfair decisions.” Id., at 13221 (remarks of Sen. Heinz).

Legislating in a near-crisis atmosphere, Congress saw itself as wrestling with the Executive Branch for control of the disability insurance program. It emphatically repudiated SSA’s policy of restrictive, illiberal, and hasty benefit reviews, and adopted a number of prospective measures designed “to prevent further reckless reviews,” id., at 13229 (remarks of Sen. Cranston), and to ensure that recipients dependent on disability benefits for their sustenance would be adequately protected in any future review proceedings.

At no point during the lengthy legislative debate, however, did any Member of Congress so much as hint that the substantive eligibility criteria, notice requirements, and interim payment provisions that would govern future disability reviews adequately redressed the harms that beneficiaries may have suffered as a result of the unconstitutional actions of individual state and federal officials in past proceedings, or that the constitutional rights of those unjustly deprived of benefits in the past had to be sacrificed in the name of administrative efficiency or any other governmental interest. The Court today identifies no legislative compromise, “inevitable” or otherwise, in which lawmakers expressly declined to afford a remedy for such past wrongs. Nor can the Court point to any legislator who suggested that state and federal officials should be shielded from liability for any unconstitutional acts taken in the course of administering the review program, or that exposure to liability for such acts would be inconsistent with Congress’ comprehensive and carefully crafted remedial scheme.

Although the Court intimates that Congress consciously chose not to afford any remedies beyond the prospective protections set out in the 1984 Reform Act itself, see ante, at 426, the one legislator the Court identifies as bemoaning the Act’s inadequate response to past wrongs argued only that the legislation should have permitted all recipients, including *440 those whose benefits were terminated before December 31, 1984, to seek a redetermination of their eligibility under the new review standards. See 130 Cong. Rec. 6586 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Perkins). Neither this legislator nor any other, however, discussed the possibility or desirability of redressing injuries flowing from the temporary loss of benefits in those cases where the benefits were ultimately restored on administrative appeal. The possibility that courts might act in the absence of congressional measures was never even discussed, let alone factored into Congress’ response to the emergency it faced.

The mere fact that Congress was aware of the prior injustices and failed to provide a form of redress for them, standing alone, is simply not a “special factor counselling hesitation” in the judicial recognition of a remedy. Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of congressional intent, see, e. g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U. S. 574, 600 (1983); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U. S. 168, 185-186, n. 21 (1969), all the more so where Congress is legislating in the face of a massive breakdown calling for prompt and sweeping corrective measures. In 1984, Congress undertook to resuscitate a disability review process that had ceased functioning: that the prospective measures it prescribed to prevent future dislocations included no remedy for past wrongs in no way suggests a conscious choice to leave those wrongs unremedied. I therefore think it altogether untenable to conclude, on the basis of mere legislative silence and inaction, that Congress intended an administrative scheme that does not even take cognizance of constitutional claims to displace a damages action for constitutional deprivations that might arise in the administration of the disability insurance program.

B

Our decisions in Chappell and Bush reveal yet another flaw in the “special factors” analysis the Court employs *441 today. In both those cases, we declined to legislate in areas in which Congress enjoys a special expertise that the Judiciary clearly lacks. Thus, in Chappell , we dealt with military affairs, a subject over which “[i]t is clear that the Constitution contemplated that the Legislative Branch have plenary control.” 462 U. S., at 301 Indeed, as we reaffirmed:

“ ‘[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject ahvays to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.’” Id., at 302 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 10 (1973)) (emphasis in original).

Similarly, in Bush we dealt with the unique area of federal employment relations, where the Government acts not as governor but as employer. We observed that Congress had devoted a century to studying the problems peculiar to this subject, during the course of which it had “developed considerable familiarity with balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of employees.” 462 U. S., at 389. In addition, Congress “has a special interest in informing itself about the efficiency and morale of the Executive Branch,” and is far more capable than courts of apprising itself of such matters “through factfinding procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts.” Ibid. In declining to recognize a cause of action for constitutional violations that might arise in the civil service context, therefore, we reasoned that the recognition of such an action could upset Congress’ careful structuring of federal employment relations, and concluded that “Congress is in a far better position to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil service.” Ibid.

*442 Ignoring the unique characteristics of the military and civil service contexts that made judicial recognition of a Bivens action inappropriate in those cases, the Court today observes that “[congressional competence at ‘balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals]’ is no more questionable in the social welfare context than it is in the civil service context.” Ante, at 425 (quoting Bush, supra, at 389 ). This observation, however, avails the Court nothing, for in Bush we declined to create a Bivens action for aggrieved federal employees not because Congress is simply competent to legislate in the area of federal employment relations, but because Congress is far more capable of addressing the special problems that arise in those relations than are courts. Thus, I have no quarrel with the Court’s assertion that in Bush we did not decline to create a Bivens action because we believed such an action would be more disruptive in the civil service context than elsewhere, but because we were “‘convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating [such an action.]”’ Ante, at 427 (quoting Bush, supra, at 390 ). That conviction, however, flowed not from mere congressional competence to legislate in the area of federal employment relations, but from our recognition that we lacked the special expertise Congress had developed in such matters, as well as the ability to evaluate the impact such a right of action would have on the civil service. . See Bush, supra, at 389 .

The Court’s suggestion, therefore, that congressional authority over a given subject is itself a “special factor” that “counsel[sj hesitation [even] in the absence of affirmative action by Congress,” see Bivens, 403 U. S., at 396 , is clearly mistaken. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U. S. 228 (1979), we recognized a cause of action under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for a congressional employee who alleged that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex, even though Congress is competent to pass legislation governing the employment relations of its own Members, see *443 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-16(a) (excluding congressional employees from the coverage of §717 of Title VII). Likewise, in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), we created a Bivens action for redress of injuries flowing from the allegedly unconstitutional conduct of federal prison officials, notwithstanding the fact that Congress had expressly (and competently) provided a statutory remedy in the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries inflicted by such officials. In neither case was it necessary to inquire into Congress’ competence over the subject matter. Rather, we permitted the claims because they arose in areas in which congressional competence is no greater than that of the courts, and in which, therefore, courts need not fear to tread even in the absence of congressional action.

The same is true here. Congress, of course, created the disability insurance program and obviously may legislate with respect to it. But unlike the military setting, where Congress’ authority is plenary and entitled to considerable judicial deference, or the federal employment context, where Congress enjoys special expertise, social welfare is hardly an area in which the courts are largely incompetent to act. The disability insurance program- is concededly large, but it does not involve necessarily unique relationships like those between enlisted military personnel and their superior officers, or Government workers and their federal employers. Rather, like the federal law enforcement and penal systems that gave rise to the constitutional claims in Bivens and Carlson, supra, the constitutional issues that surface in the social welfare system turn on the relationship of the Government and those it governs — the relationship that lies at the heart of constitutional adjudication. Moreover, courts do not lack familiarity or expertise in determining what the dictates of the Due Process Clause are. In short, the social welfare context does not give rise to the types of concerns that make it an area where courts should refrain from creat *444 ing a damages action even in the absence of congressional action.

Ill

Because I do not agree that the scope and design of Title II’s administrative review process is a “special factor” precluding recognition of a Bivens action, I turn to petitioners’ remaining arguments as to why we should not recognize such an action here.

A

Petitioners contend that Congress has explicitly precluded the creation of a Bivens remedy in Title II itself. Section 405(h) provides:

“The findings and decision of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against the United States, the Secretary, or any officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 1346 of title 28 to recover on any claim arising under [Title II].” 42 U. S. C. § 405 (h) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

The only provision in Title II for judicial review of the Secretary’s decisions is set out in 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g). Petitioners argue that because the second sentence of § 405(h) precludes review of any agency decision except as provided under § 405 (g), and that because the full remedy available following administrative or judicial review under the latter subsection is retroactive payment of any wrongfully terminated disability benefits, Congress has expressly precluded all other remedies for such wrongful terminations.

We just recently rejected this argument, explaining that “[t]he purpose of ‘the first two sentences of § 405(h),’ as we made clear in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749, 757 (1975), is to ‘assure that administrative exhaustion will be re *445 quired.’” Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U. S. 667, 679, n. 8 (1986). The exhaustion requirement, however, does not apply where “there is no hearing, and thus no administrative remedy, to exhaust.” Ibid. As in Michigan Academy, respondents here do not contest any decision reached after a hearing to which they were parties, for those decisions resulted in the full restoration of their benefits. Instead, they seek review of allegedly unconstitutional conduct and decisions that preceded the initial termination of their benefits. Their constitutional challenge to such conduct, like the attack on the agency regulation in Michigan Academy, is simply not cognizable in the administrative process, and thus any limitations the exhaustion requirement might impose on remedies available through that process are inapplicable here. Cf. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U. S. 602, 617 (1984) (where parties “have an adequate remedy in § 405(g) for challenging all aspects of the Secretary’s denial of their claims ...[,] § 405(g) is the only avenue for judicial review of [their] claims for benefits”) (emphasis added). Moreover, § 405(g) itself says nothing whatever about remedies, but rather establishes a limitations period and defines the scope of review governing judicial challenges to final agency decisions. Had Congress set out remedies in § 405(g) and declared them exclusive, I might agree that we would be precluded from recognizing a Bivens action. But limitations on a specific remedy — judicial review of agency decisions after a hearing — do not in and of themselves amount to an express preclusion of other, unspecified, remedies such as Bivens actions.

Petitioners also contend that the final sentence of § 405(h) establishes another, independent bar to creation of a Bivens action. In isolation, the sentence might well, suggest such a broad preclusion, for it bars resort to federal-question jurisdiction — the jurisdictional basis of Bivens actions — for recovery on any claims arising under Title II. The sentence, however, does not appear in isolation, but is rather part of a *446 subsection governing a discrete category of claims: those brought to findings of fact or final decisions of the Secretary after a hearing to which the claimant was a party. Read in context, therefore, the final sentence serves as an adjunct to the exhaustion requirement established in the first two sentences by channeling any and all challenges to benefits determinations through the administrative process and thereby forestalling attempts to circumvent that process under the guise of independent constitutional challenges. See Heckler v. Ringer, supra, at 615-616 (§ 405(h) barred federal-question jurisdiction over constitutional challenge to Secretary’s refusal to provide reimbursement for certain medical procedures); Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, at 760-761 (§ 405(H) barred federal-question jurisdiction over constitutional challenge leveled at regulation that rendered claimant ineligible for benefits). Respondents here do not contest any benefits determination, nor have they attempted to bypass the administrative review process: rather, having exhausted the remedies that process provides, they now seek relief for constitutional injuries they suffered in the course of their benefits determinations which the administrative scheme left unredressed. In Michigan Academy, supra, we declined to conclude that the last sentence of § 405(h) “by its terms prevents any resort to the grant of federal-question jurisdiction contained in 28 U. S. C. § 1331 ,” id., at 679-680 ; because I do not believe that the sentence in question applies to claims such as these respondents assert, I conclude that Congress has not expressly precluded the Bivens remedy respondents seek.

B

Finally, petitioners argue that the sheer size of the disability insurance program is a special factor militating against recognition of a Bivens action for respondents’ claims. SSA is “probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world,” Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U. S. 458, 461 , n, 2 (1983) (internal quotations and citation timitted), responsible for *447 processing over 2 million disability claims each year. Heckler v. Day, 467 U. S. 104, 106 (1984). Accordingly, petitioners argue, recognition of a Bivens action for any due process violations that might occur in the course of this processing would have an intolerably disruptive impact on the administration of the disability insurance program. Thousands of such suits could potentially, be brought, diverting energy and money from the goals of the program itself, discouraging public service in the agency, and deterring those officials brave enough to accept such employment from “legitimate efforts” to ensure that only those truly unable to work receive benefits. Brief for Petitioners 47.

Petitioners’ dire predictions are overblown in several respects. To begin with, Congress’ provision for interim payments in both the 1983 emergency legislation, see n. 3, supra, and the 1984 Reform Act dramatically reduced the number of recipients who suffered consequential damages as a result of initial unconstitutional benefits termination. Similarly, the various other corrective measures incorporated in the 1984 legislation, which petitioners champion here as a complete remedy for past wrongs, should forestall future constitutional deprivations. Moreover, in order to prevail in any Bivens , action, recipients such as respondents must both prove a deliberate abuse of governmental power rather than mere negligence, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327 (1986), and overcome the defense of qualified immunity. 5 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S. 800 (1982). Indeed, these very requirements are designed to protect Government officials from liability for their “legitimate” actions; the prospect of liability for deliberate violations of known constitutional rights, therefore, will not dissuade well-intentioned civil servants either from accepting such employment or from carrying out the legitimate duties that employment imposes.

*448 Petitioners’ argument, however, is more fundamentally flawed. Both the federal law enforcement system involved in Bivens and the federal prison system involved in Carlson v. Green, 446 U. S. 14 (1980), are vast undertakings, and the possibility that individuals who come in contact with these Government entities will consider themselves aggrieved by the misuse of official power is at least as great as that presented by the social welfare program involved here. Yet in neither case did we even hint that such factors might legitimately counsel against recognition of a remedy for those actually injured by the abuse of such authority. See Bivens, 403 U. S., at 410 (Harían, J., concurring in judgment) (“I. . . cannot agree . . . that the possibility of frivolous’ claims . . . warrants closing the courthouse doors to people in Bivens’ situation. There are other ways, short of that, of coping with frivolous lawsuits”). Indeed, in Bivens itself we rejected the suggestion that state law should govern the liability of federal officials charged with unconstitutional conduct precisely because officials “acting . . . in the name of the United States posses[s] a far greater capacity for harm than [a private] individual. . . exercising no authority other than his own.” Id.., at 392. That the authority wielded by officials in this case may be used to harm an especially large number of innocent citizens, therefore, militates in favor of a cause of action, not against one, and petitioners’ argument to the contrary perverts the entire purpose underlying our recognition of Bivens actions. In the modern welfare society in which we live, where many individuals such as respondents depend on government benefits for their sustenance, the Due Process Clause stands as an essential guarantee against arbitrary governmental action. The scope of any given welfare program is relevant to determining what process is due those dependent upon it, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976), but it can never free the administrators of that program from all constitutional restraints, and should likewise not excuse those administrators from liability when they *449 act in clear contravention of the Due Process Clause’s commands.

IV

After contributing to the disability insurance program throughout their working lives, respondents turned to it for essential support when disabling medical conditions prevented them from providing for themselves. If the allegations of their complaints are true, they were unjustly deprived of this essential support by state and federal officials acting beyond the bounds of their authority and in violation of respondents’ constitutional rights. That respondents suffered grievous harm as a result of these actions — harm for which the belated restoration of disability benefits in no way compensated them — is undisputed and indisputable. Yet the Court today declares that respondents and others like them may recover nothing from the officials allegedly responsible for these injuries because Congress failed to include such a remedy among the reforms it enacted in an effort to rescue the disability insurance program from a paralyzing breakdown. Because I am convinced that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial recognition of a cause of action for such injuries, and because I believe there are no special factors militating against the creation of such a remedy here, I dissent.

Under the 1984 standard, the agency may terminate benefits only if (1) substantial evidence demonstrates that the recipient’s impairment has medically improved and that he or she is able to engage in substantial gainful activity; (2) new and substantial medical evidence reveals that, although the recipient’s condition has not improved medically, he or she has benefit-ted from medical or vocational therapy and is able to engage in substantial gainful activity; (3) new or improved diagnostic techniques or evaluations demonstrate that the recipient’s impairment is not as disabling as was previously determined and that he or she is able to engage in substantial gainful activity; or (4) substantial evidence, including any evidence previously on record, demonstrates that a prior eligibility determination was erroneous. Pub. L. 98-460, §2 , 98 Stat. 1794 -1796, 42 U. S. C. 8423(f) (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

Congress also barred any further certification of class actions challenging SSA’s medical improvement criteria and directed a remand of all such pending actions in order to afford the agency an opportunity to apply the newly prescribed standard. Pub. L. 98-460, §2 (d), 98 Stat. 1797 -1798, note following 42 U. S. C. § 423 .

The 1984 legislation directed SSA to revise its mental impairment criteria and extended an administratively imposed moratorium on mental impairment reviews until the new criteria were in place; mandated consideration of the combined effects of multiple impairments in cases where no single disability is sufficiently severe to establish a recipient’s eligibility for benefits; and called for a study on the use of subjective evidence of pain in disability evaluations. Pub. L. 98-460, 883 , 4, 5, note following 42 U. S. C. 8421, 42 U. S. C. 8423(d)(2)(C), and note following 42 U. S. C. 8423 (1982 ed., Supp. IV).

Congress had previously responded to complaints concerning the high reversal rate of termination decisions by passing temporary legislation in 1983 that provided for interim payments during appeal through the ALJ stage, see Pub. L. 97-455, §2 , 96 Stat. 2498,42 U. S. C. § 423(g) (1982 ed. and Supp. IV); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-1039, p. 33 (1984). The 1984 Reform Act extended this authorization through January 1,1988, and provided for recoupment of such payments in those cases where termination decisions are affirmed by SSA’s Appeals Council, unless the agency determines that such recoupment would work an undue hardship. 42 U. S. C. §423 (g) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). In December 1987, Congress extended the interim payment provision through 1989. See §9009 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 42 U. S. C. § 423(g)(1)(C) (1982 ed. and Supp. V).

The legislative debate over the 1984 Reform Act is replete with anecdotal evidence of recipients who lost their cars and homes, and of some who may even have died as a result of benefit' terminations. See, e. g., 130 Cong. Rec. 6588 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Regula); id., at 6596 (remarks of Rep. Glickman).

Two of respondents’ claims, those challenging the acceleration of the CDR program and the nonacquiescence in Ninth Circuit decisions, have already fallen to this defense. See ante, at 419. .