stating that an indictment may be quashed because of prosecutorial misconduct only where the improper conduct “substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations” (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that an indictment may be quashed because of prosecutorial misconduct only where the improper conduct “substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations” (internal quotation marks omitted)
- explaining that Rule 6(e) errors may be "remedied adequately by means other than dismissal," including, e.g. , punishing the violation as a contempt of court, disciplining a prosecutor and requesting the bar or DOJ initiate disciplinary proceedings, and chastising the prosecutor in a published opinion
- holding federal courts cannot exercise their supervisory authority to circumvent the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a), which requires federal courts to “disregard[ ]” any error in criminal proceedings that does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights
- explaining that a facially valid indictment is not subject to “a challenge to the reliability or competence of the evidence presented to the grand jury,” because “a court may not look behind the indictment to determine if the evidence upon which it was based is 15 sufficient”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Brown, 293 Ga. 493 (2013)
Likewise the State’s citation to Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U. S. 250 (108 SCt 2369, 101 LE2d 228) (1988) is inapposite because that case did not challenge the indictment on the basis that it was not returned in open court.
Distinguished by United States v. Derrick, 163 F.3d 799 (1998)
Instead, the district court relied on a number of district court cases — all of which predated Hasting or Nova Scotia or both, and most of which are easily distinguishable from the present case in any event.
The opinion
Justice Marshall,
dissenting.
I cannot concur in the Court’s decision to apply harmless-error analysis to violations of Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. I already have outlined my objections to the Court’s approach, which converts “Congress’ command regarding the proper conduct of grand jury proceedings to a mere form of words, without practical effect.” United States v. Mechanik, 475 U. S. 66, 84 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Because of the strict protection of the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, instances of prosecutorial misconduct rarely come to light. This is especially true in the pretrial setting, because defendants’ chief source of information about grand jury proceedings is governmental disclosures under the Jencks Act, 18 U. S. C. §3500 , which do not *265 occur until trial is underway. The fact that a prosecutor knows that a Rule 6 violation is unlikely to be discovered gives the Rule little enough bite. To afford the occasional revelation of prosecutorial misconduct the additional insulation of harmless-error analysis leaves Rule 6 toothless. Moreover, as I argued in Mechanik , in this context “[a]ny case-by-case analysis to determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced is simply too speculative to afford defendants meaningful protection, and imposes a difficult burden on the courts that outweighs the benefits to be derived.” 475 U. S., at 86 . Given the nature of grand jury proceedings, Rule 6 violations can be deterred and redressed effectively only by a per se rule of dismissal. Today’s decision reduces Rule 6 to little more than a code of honor that prosecutors can violate with virtual impunity. I respectfully dissent.