holding that an individual is -1181 acting under color of state law when he is exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law
How later courts described this case
- holding that an individual is -1181 acting under color of state law when he is exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law
- concluding that injury caused by state action was compounded because it occurred in a courthouse
- finding a private physician a state actor where 27 5 Defendant does not dispute that he was employed by Pinal County, as the pleadings 28 seem to indicate; instead, he argues only that Plaintiff’s claims against him fail because Plaintiff did not explicitly allege that he was a state actor or that he acted under state law. 1 he was hired by a state prison to provide medical care to inmates
- finding physician directly "employed by North Carolina to provide medical services to state prison inmates” a state actor, but emphasizing that "[t]he correctional setting ... inevitably affects the exercise of professional judgment,” because "the nonmedical functions of prison life inevitably influence the nature, timing, and form of medical care provided to inmates”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kach v. Hose ex rel. St. Moritz Security Services, Inc., 589 F.3d 626 (2009)
” Id. at 55, 108 S.Ct. 2250. West is plainly distinguishable on its facts, as it is well-settled law that public high school students are not comparable to prisoners or the involuntarily committed because "parents remain the [students'] primary caretakers” and because students “may turn to persons unrelated to the state for help on a daily basis.
Distinguished by No. 04-1792, 412 F.3d 1 (2005)
In addition,West is distinguishable from the case at hand because in West, the defendant-physician's actions took place within a state-run prison hospital and the plaintiff-prisoner was precluded by state law from seeking treatment from a physician of his own choosing. 487 U.S. at 43-44, 108 S.Ct. 2250.
Distinguished by Mitchell v. St. Elizabeth Hospital, 119 F. App'x 1 (2004)
But West is distinguishable.
Distinguished by American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999)
West is readily distinguishable: There the State was constitutionally obligated to provide medical treatment to injured inmates, and the delegation of that traditionally exclusive public function to a private physician gave rise to a finding of state action.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the opinion of the Court that respondent acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1988. I do not believe that a doctor who lacks supervisory or other penological duties can inflict “punishment” within the meaning of that term in the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F. 2d 1028, 1031-1032 (CA2) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied sub nom. John v. Johnson, 414 U. S. 1033 (1973). I am also of the view, however, that a physician who acts on behalf of the State to provide needed medical attention to a person involuntarily in state custody (in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from otherwise obtaining it, and who causes physical harm to such a person by deliberate indifference, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 315, 324 (1982) (dictum); see generally Daniels v. Williams, 474 U. S. 327, 331 (1986); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 672-674 , and n. 41 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 169-174 (1952); Johnson, supra, at 1032-1033. I note that petitioner’s pro se complaint merely claimed violation of his rights, and it is the courts that have specified which constitutional provision confers those rights.