holding relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may be appropriate where a judge’s failure to disqualify himself violates 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a); stating, “in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.”
How later courts described this case
- holding relief under Rule 60(b)(6) may be appropriate where a judge’s failure to disqualify himself violates 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a); stating, “in determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455(a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process.”
- stating 25 26 1 Dkt. No. 1345 is Feathers’s “Administrative Motion Under Civil Local Rule 7-11 Requesting the Court Direct $40,000 Prior Reserves Established for Legal Fees of the Receiver to Be Redirected 27 to Defendant for Review of Constitutional Due Process Violations Motions for Relief.” Case No.: 5:12-cv-03237-EJD 1 that Rule 60(b)(6) “should only be applied in extraordinary circumstances” (internal citations 2 omitted)
- holding that the necessity of Rule 60(b)(6) vacatur due to violations of Section 455(a) should be determined by looking at (1) “the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case,” (2) the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases,” and (3) “the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process”
- holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) relief is available for certain section 455 violations depending upon the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public’s confidence in the judicial process
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lucky Development Co. v. Tokai, U.S.A., Inc., 3 N. Mar. I. 79 (1992)
The case of Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988), cited by Atalig at oral argument, is distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
dissenting.
For the reasons given by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ante, at 871-873, I agree that “constructive knowledge” cannot be the basis for a violation of 28 U. S. C. § 455 (a). The question then remains whether respondent is entitled to a new trial because there are other “extraordinary circumstances,” apart from the § 455(a) violation found by the Fifth Circuit, that justify “relief from the operation of the judgment.” See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6); Ackermann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 199 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949). Although the Court collects an impressive array of arguments that might support the granting of such relief, I believe the issue should be addressed in the first instance by the courts below. I would therefore remand this case with appropriate instructions.