concluding that a death sentence had to be reexamined where one of the aggravating circumstances was based on a prior conviction for a violent felony and the conviction had since been reversed, declining to consider whether the aggravating circumstance could be sustained based solely on evidence of the conduct underlying the reversed conviction where the prosecutor did not introduce any such evidence, and noting that "[s]ince that conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a death sentence had to be reexamined where one of the aggravating circumstances was based on a prior conviction for a violent felony and the conviction had since been reversed, declining to consider whether the aggravating circumstance could be sustained based solely on evidence of the conduct underlying the reversed conviction where the prosecutor did not introduce any such evidence, and noting that "[s]ince that conviction has been reversed, unless and until petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge"
- observing that where a rule has not been consistently or regularly applied, it is notunder federal lawan adequate and independent state ground for affirming petitioner's conviction.
- holding that allowing a death sentence to stand that was based in part on a prior conviction that was later vacated violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and unusual punishment
- holding that a state procedural rule in not “adequate” to bar federal habeas review unless the rule “is strictly or regularly followed” (quotations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by United States v. Billie Jerome Allen, United States of America v. Norris G. Holder, 247 F.3d 741 (2001)
We disagree with Holder’s assertion that the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) controls this issue.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Tully, 54 Cal. 4th 952 (2012)
Johnson is inapposite.
Distinguished by Harmon v. State, 248 P.3d 918 (2011)
¶ 63 A review of the Johnson case cited by Harmon shows that it is easily distinguishable from this one.
Distinguished by People v. Barnwell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82 (2007)
) Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 is inapposite.[15]
Distinguished by Reeves v. Hopkins, 871 F. Supp. 1182 (1994)
486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 1981, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988), but it, too, is inapposite.
The opinion
*591 Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion except insofar as the judgment, which is without prejudice to further sentencing proceedings, does not expressly preclude the reimposition of the death penalty. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would direct that the resentenc-ing proceedings be circumscribed such that the State may not reimpose the death sentence.