holding that defendant was not seized by police where the record did not reflect that the police had activated a siren or flashers, commanded the defendant to halt, or displayed any weapons and concluding that even though officer’s behavior of driving his patrol car parallel to a running pedestrian “could be somewhat intimidating,” such “police presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant was not seized by police where the record did not reflect that the police had activated a siren or flashers, commanded the defendant to halt, or displayed any weapons and concluding that even though officer’s behavior of driving his patrol car parallel to a running pedestrian “could be somewhat intimidating,” such “police presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure.”
- holding that no seizure had occurred because the record did not "reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that they commanded [the defendant] to halt, or displayed any weapons; or that they operated the car in an aggressive manner to block [the defendant's] course or otherwise control the direction or speed of his movement”
- holding that when a person has been restrained through a show of authority, that person has been seized “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave”
- recognizing that an officer’s subjective intentions are “relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment implications of police conduct . . . to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person confronted” (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Mamon, 435 Mich. 1 (1990)
The defendant contends that Chesternut is distinguishable from the instant case.
The opinion
Justice Kennedy,
with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring.
It is no bold step to conclude, as the Court does, that the evidence should have been admitted, for respondent’s unprovoked flight gave the police ample cause to stop him. The Court instead concentrates on the significance of the chase; and as to that it is fair to interpret its opinion as finding no more than an absence of-improper conduct. We would do well to add that, barring the need to inquire about hot pur *577 suit, which is not at issue here, neither “chase” nor “investigative pursuit” need be included in the lexicon of the Fourth Amendment.
A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when an individual remains in the control of law enforcement officials because he reasonably believes, on the basis of their conduct toward him, that he is not free to go. See, e. g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210, 215 (1984); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U. S. 544, 554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). The case before us presented an opportunity to consider whether even an unmistakable show of authority can result in the seizure of a person who attempts to elude apprehension and who discloses contraband or other incriminating evidence before he is ultimately detained. It is at least plausible to say that whether or not the officers’ conduct communicates to a person a reasonable belief that they intend to apprehend him, such conduct does not implicate Fourth Amendment protections until it achieves a restraining effect. The Court’s opinion does not foreclose this holding, and I concur.