holding that that jury instructions in a death penalty case that create a “substantial probability” that jurors would erroneously believe that they must unanimously agree on the existence of a mitigating circumstance before considering it in the weighing process violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
How later courts described this case
- holding that that jury instructions in a death penalty case that create a “substantial probability” that jurors would erroneously believe that they must unanimously agree on the existence of a mitigating circumstance before considering it in the weighing process violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
- holding that due process is violated "[i]f there is a substantial possibility that reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge's instructions. . . ., well might have thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating circumstances unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular such circumstance" (emphasis added)
- recognizing that the sentencer in a capital proceeding may not be prevented from taking into consideration, as a mitigating factor, any relevant circumstance, including any facet of the accused's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the accused offers as a justification for a sentence less than death
- holding unconstitutional Maryland’s sentencing-phase jury instructions where the instructions created “a substantial probability that reasonable jurors ... well may have thought they were precluded from considering any mitigating evidence unless all 12 jurors agreed on the existence of a particular [mitigating] circumstance”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Eugene Williams Gall, Jr. v. Phil Parker, Warden, 231 F.3d 265 (2000)
We therefore disagree with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have found that Mills announced a “new rule” under Teague.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874 (2018)
Consequently, in Hanson , we reasoned that Mills was inapposite in discerning the import of Oklahoma's reformation of the mitigation instruction and, more specifically, its moral-culpability text.
Distinguished by Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810 (2015)
We therefore reject Hanson’s suggestion that Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988), is germane.
Distinguished by Garza v. Thaler, 909 F. Supp. 2d 578 (2012)
Thus, Mills is inapplicable.”), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1067, 115 S.Ct. 711, 130 L.Ed.2d 618 (1995); Bartee v. Quarterman, 574 F.Supp.2d at 700-01 (rejecting reliance upon Mills and McKoy as bases for challenging the very different Texas capital sentencing scheme).
Distinguished by Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284 (1991)
Thus, Mills is clearly distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion and agree fully with its analysis as to why, under our current death penalty jurisprudence, the death sentence in this case must be vacated. I write separately only because the judgment, which is without prejudice to further sentencing proceedings, does not expressly preclude the reimposition of the death penalty. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227 (1976), I would direct that the resentencing proceedings be circumscribed such that the State may not reimpose the death sentence.