holding that aggravating circumstance of “especially heinous” murder did not perform the constitutionally required narrowing function because an ordinary person could believe that it described every unjustified, intentional murder and no limiting construction was provided by the court
How later courts described this case
- holding that aggravating circumstance of “especially heinous” murder did not perform the constitutionally required narrowing function because an ordinary person could believe that it described every unjustified, intentional murder and no limiting construction was provided by the court
- stating, without more guidance defining terms in aggravating circumstance, “an ordinary person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is ‘especially heinous’”
- holding that a jury instruction directing the jury to find that the murder must involve “some kind of torture or serious physical abuse” would be sufficient to cure any vagueness problem
- upholding the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' interpretation of the 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' aggravating circumstance to require, before a death sentence is imposed, a finding that the victim was tortured or was caused to suffer serious physical abuse
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Benn, 120 Wash. 2d 631 (1993)
Maynard and Godfrey are inapposite.
Distinguished by Porter v. Dugger, 777 F. Supp. 934 (1991)
In Part I Section 3 of the order, the Court held that Maynard is inapplicable to Petitioner’s case because Florida’s interpretation of “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).
Distinguished by Shell v. State, 554 So. 2d 887 (1989)
Maynard is distinguishable from this case for several reasons.
Distinguished by Jones v. Dugger, 533 So. 2d 290 (1988)
Because Jones' killing was not found to be heinous, atrocious, and cruel, Maynard is inapplicable to this case.
The opinion
Justice Brennan,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion except insofar as the judgment, which is without prejudice to further sentencing proceedings, does not expressly preclude the reimposition of the death penalty. Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), I would direct that the re-sentencing proceedings be circumscribed such that the State may not reimpose the death sentence.