explaining that because “[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict ... the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that because “[t]he likelihood and dimensions of nascent conflicts of interest are notoriously hard to predict ... the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses”
- explaining that "while the right to select and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment, the essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant ... [is] represented by the lawyer whom he prefers," and thus there is "a presumption in favor of [a defendant's] counsel of choice," though that right is not absolute
- holding that federal courts “must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [of interest] but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court”
- holding that the judge must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing to accept an defendant's waiver of a conflict of interest "not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by United States v. Manuel Ramos, 350 F. Supp. 2d 413 (2004)
486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, is surely called into question when an indigent defendant is assigned a lawyer who has been indicted by a grand jury on a charge of victimizing the family of an indigent client.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Blackmun joins, dissenting.
This is not the first case in which the Court has demonstrated “its apparent unawareness of the function of the independent lawyer as a guardian of our freedom.” Walters v. National Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U. S. 305, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). But even under the Court’s paternalistic view of the citizen’s right to select his or her own lawyer, its analysis of this case is seriously flawed. As Justice Marshall demonstrates, the Court exaggerates the significance of the potential conflict. See ante, at 168-172. Of greater importance, the Court gives inadequate weight to the informed and voluntary character of the clients’ waiver of their right to conflict-free representation. Particularly, the Court virtually ignores the fact that additional counsel representing petitioner had provided him with sound advice concerning the wisdom of a waiver and would have remained available during the trial to assist in the defense. Thus, this is not a case in which the District Judge faced the question whether one counsel should be substituted for another; rather the question before him *173 was whether petitioner should be permitted to have additional counsel of his choice. I agree with Justice Marshall that the answer to that question is perfectly clear.
Accordingly, although I agree with the Court’s premise that district judges must be afforded wide latitude in passing on motions of this kind, * in this case it is abundantly clear to me that the District Judge abused his discretion and deprived this petitioner of a constitutional right of such fundamental character that reversal is required.
In my view, deference to the trial judge is appropriate in light of his or her greater familiarity with such factors as the ability of the defendant knowingly and voluntarily to waive a potential conflict (including the possibility that a codefendant may be exerting undue influence over the defendant), the character of the lawyers, the particular facts of the case, and the availability of alternative counsel of a like caliber.