explaining that "[p]robation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments" and probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions' " (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) )
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "[p]robation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments" and probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only ... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions' " (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) )
- stating that “probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and [assures] that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large,” and “[t]hese same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact observed”
- holding that a warrantless search of a probationer's home was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and noting that the special nature of probationary supervision justified a departure from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements for a search
- holding that a state regulation allowing warrantless searches of a probationer’s home upon reasonable suspicion of a probation violation was reasonable under the special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by State v. LaFromboise, 1996 N.D. LEXIS 17 (1996)
483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987), the continuing validity of the
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Manuel, 342 F. App'x 844 (2009)
Griffin is distinguishable on similar grounds.
Distinguished by United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1 (2007)
the first opportunity we have had to address this issue in the context of an individual on supervised release, we have addressed similar challenges in the context of parole and probation,” and following those previous rulings).9 Finally, as we have explained, law enforcement objectives are central to the DNA Act, and thus the analysis applicable to special needs “beyond the normal need for law enforcement,” Griffin,…
Distinguished by AA Ex Rel. BA v. ATTY. GENERAL, 384 N.J. Super. 67 (2006)
The Court did not distinguish the cases on the basis of law enforcement "purpose"; rather the Court indicated that the "special needs" exception of Griffin was inapplicable because the search was not conducted by a probation officer pursuant to a reasonable regulation.
Distinguished by Soca v. State, 656 So. 2d 536 (1995)
The defendant argues that Griffin is inapplicable to this case because the United States Supreme Court only approved the search in that case because of Wisconsin's regulatory scheme, and, he further argues, there is no such similar scheme in Florida.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
with whom
Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
Mere speculation by a police officer that a probationer “may have had” contraband in his possession is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a private home. I simply do not understand how five Members of this Court can reach a contrary conclusion. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.