Opinion

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air

  • 483 U.S. 711
  • 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20929
  • 55 U.S.L.W. 5113
  • 26 ERC (BNA) 1091
  • 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1750
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Jun 26, 1987
Status
Published
Author
O'Connor
On the bench
White, Rehnquist, Powell, O'Connor, Scalia, Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens
Cited by
784 cases
Authority
More cited than 24.2%

Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) — not on the Supreme Court's list

looking to Congressional intent to determine that only prevailing parties should be entitled to fees under statute: “counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, for all time reasonably expended on a matter.”

How later courts described this case

  • looking to Congressional intent to determine that only prevailing parties should be entitled to fees under statute: “counsel for prevailing parties should be paid, as is traditional with attorneys compensated by a fee-paying client, for all time reasonably expended on a matter.”
  • noting that the attorneys for Delaware Valley were part of a non-profit, tax-exempt law corporation, but expressly declining to pass on argument--not aired in the lower courts--that such a firm, by its very nature, is ineligible for a risk-of-not-prevailing enhancement
  • stating that the lodestar figure should only be adjusted in rare and exceptional cases
  • stating that “[t]he matter may have been difficult, wearing, and time consuming, but that kind of effort has been recognized in the lodestar award.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Reported abrogated in part, on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992) — not on the Supreme Court's list

    483 U.S. 711, 723 (1987) (plurality op.), abrogated in part on other grounds by City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557
    Supreme Court of the United StatesJun 24, 19923 citing opinionsother groundsin partunconfirmed confidenceRead it

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Westheimer v. Finesod, 733 F. Supp. 1127 (1990)

    Because the Terra-Drill litigation is a "common fund” rather than a statutory fee case, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987) ("Delaware Valley II"), is inapplicable.
    District Court, S.D. TexasMar 27, 19902 citing opinionsRead it
  • Distinguished by a later decision, 855 F.2d 37 (1988)

    We agree that the considerations that led the Delaware Valley II plurality to limit the use of risk-enhancement factors "under the usual fee-shifting statutes," --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3087, are inapplicable in the SSA context, where the award of attorney's fees is predicated on a pre-existing, consensual agreement between the attorney and the client.
    Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitAug 9, 19882 citing opinionsRead it

The opinion

Justice O’Connor,

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

For the reasons explained by the dissent I conclude that Congress did not intend to foreclose consideration of contingency in setting a reasonable fee under fee-shifting provisions such as that of the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7604 (d), and the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 . I also agree that compensation for contingency must be based on the difference in market treatment of contingent fee cases as a class, rather than on an assessment of the “riskiness” of any particular case. But in my view the plurality is also correct in holding that the “novelty and difficulty of the issues presented, and . . . the potential for protracted litigation,” ante, at 726, are factors adequately reflected in the lodestar, and that the District Court erred in employing a risk multiplier in the circumstances of this case.

The private market commonly compensates for contingency through arrangements in which the attorney receives a percentage of the damages awarded to the plaintiff. In most fee-shifting cases, however, the private market model of contingency compensation will provide very little guidance. See Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U. S. 561, 573-576 (1986). Thus it is unsurprising that when courts have enhanced fee awards to *732 compensate for risk, “[pinpointing the degree of risk [has been] one of the most subjective and difficult components of the fee computation process, and one which [has been] apt to lead to imprecision in the final award.” 2 M. Derfner & A. Wolf, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, ¶ 16.04 [c] [i], p. 16-88 (1986). Although the dissent suggests a method of calculating compensation for contingency that is theoretically more satisfying than the practice of speculating on the riskiness of each case, the dissent does not explain how the theory should be put into practice. For example, how should a court translate the extra economic risk endured by smaller firms, see post, at 750-751, or by firms that take unpopular cases, see post, at 751, n. 15, into a percentage enhancement?

Moreover, although the dissent offers no defense of this method of compensating for risk, it leaves the door'open for “extra enhancement” for “exceptional cases” that pose great “‘legal’risk.” Post, at 751-752. The “extra enhancement” presumably would be calculated based on the likelihood at the time the litigation was commenced that the particular legal claims raised by the prevailing party would have been rejected by the court. This type of enhancement clearly is subject to the many difficulties described by the plurality. Ante, at 721-723. The dissent suggests that the plurality’s objections “lose much of their force” because the cases in which “extra enhancement” is granted will be rare. Post, at 752, n. 16. But, an arbitrary or unjust result is no less so for its rarity. Furthermore, the difficulties created by this type of enhancement will arise not only when the enhancement is granted, but also whenever it is sought. •

To be “reasonable,” the method for calculating a fee award must be not merely justifiable in theory but also objective and nonarbitrary in practice. Moreover, if the concept of treating contingency cases as a class is to be more than symbolic, a court’s determination of how the market in a community compensates for contingency should not vary significantly from one case to the next. I agree with the plurality *733 that without guidance as to the trial court’s exercise of discretion, adjustment for risk could result in “severe difficulties and possible inequities.” Ante, at 728. In my view, certain constraints on a court’s discretion in setting attorney’s fees are appropriate.

First, district courts and courts of appeals should treat a determination of how a particular market compensates for contingency as controlling future cases involving the same market. Haphazard and widely divergent compensation for risk can be avoided only if contingency cases are treated as a class; and contingency cases can be treated as a class only if courts strive for consistency from one fee determination to the next. Determinations involving different markets should also comport with each other. Thus, if a fee applicant attempts to prove that the relevant market provides greater compensation for contingency than the markets involved in previous cases, the applicant should be able to point to differences in the markets that would justify the different rates of compensation.

Second, at all times the fee applicant bears the burden of proving the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U. S. 886, 898 (1984) (“The burden of proving that such an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee is on the fee applicant”); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U. S. 424, 437 (1983) (“Where settlement is not possible, the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates”). I would also hold that a court may not enhance a fee award any more than necessary to bring the fee within the range that would attract competent counsel. I agree with the plurality that no enhancement for risk is appropriate unless the applicant can establish that without an adjustment for risk the prevailing party “would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the local or other relevant market.” Ante, at 731.

*734 Finally, a court should not award any enhancement based on “legal” risks or risks peculiar to the case. The lodestar— “the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate,” Hensley v. Eckerhart, supra, at 434—is flexible enough to account for great variation in the nature of the work performed in, and the challenges presented by, different cases. “The novelty and complexity of the issues” raised in a case “presumably [would be] fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel.” Blum, 465 U. S., at 898 . The same can be said for most other problems posed by the litigation, such as the tenacity of the defendant. The “special skill and experience of counsel should be reflected in the reasonableness of the hourly rates.” Ibid. Thus it is presumed that when counsel demonstrates considerable ability in overcoming unusual difficulties that have arisen in a case, counsel will be compensated for those accomplishments by means of an appropriate hourly rate multiplied by the hours expended.

Based on the above guidelines, the enhancement for risk awarded by the District Court in this case must be reversed. The enhancement is not supported by any findings of fact concerning the degree to which contingency is compensated in the relevant market. Neither the findings nor the evidence indicate that the large enhancements in this case were necessary to attract competent counsel in the relevant community. Moreover, it is clear that the District Court based the enhancement on “legal” risks and risks unique to the case. The considerations used by the District Court to justify the enhancement — the “new and novel issues” raised by the case, and the stubbornness of the defendants, 581 F. Supp. 1412, 1431 (1984) — should already be reflected in the number of hours expended and the hourly rate, and cannot be used again to increase the fee award.

Accordingly, I concur in Parts I, II, and III-A of the plurality and concur in the judgment reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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