holding that “union which intentionally avoids asserting discrimination claims, either so as not to antagonize the employer and thus improve its chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the perceived desires of its white membership, is liable under * * * § 1981”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “union which intentionally avoids asserting discrimination claims, either so as not to antagonize the employer and thus improve its chances of success on other issues, or in deference to the perceived desires of its white membership, is liable under * * * § 1981”
- holding that a union “discriminates” within the meaning of Title VII when it “pursue[s] a policy of rejecting disparate-treatment grievances presented by blacks solely because the claims assert racial bias and would be very troublesome to process”
- holding that liability for intentional discrimination under § 1981 requires only that decisions be premised on race, not that they be motivated by racial hostility or animus
- holding that the Glus exception did not apply, and that complainant was required to name the union even though a contractual relationship existed between an employer and union via a collective bargaining agreement
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) — not on the Supreme Court's list
482 U.S. 656, 667 (1987) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000–2(c)(1)) (emphasis in original), abrogated on other grounds, Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. — not on the Supreme Court's list
482 U.S. 656, 660 (1987), partially superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-82
Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 3, 20048 citing opinionsby statuteunconfirmed confidenceRead it
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Melvin Miller and Jay Adolf, 997 F.2d 1010 (1993)
482 U.S. 656, 662, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2621, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), this rule is inapplicable where
The opinion
Justice O’Connor,
concurring in the judgment in No. 85-1626 and dissenting in No. 85-2010.'
In light of the Court’s decision to apply a uniform characterization for limitations purposes to actions arising under 42 U. S. C. § 1981 , I agree that the most appropriate choice is each State’s limitations period for personal injury suits. But see Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261, 280-287 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Although I doubt whether the Court’s decision should be given general retroactive effect, I agree that the Court should adhere to its policy of applying the rule *690 it announces to the parties before the Court. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 301 (1967). I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court in No. 85-1626. I join Parts I through IV of Justice Powell’s opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, as to No. 85-2010.