holding that “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics [and s]uch discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics [and s]uch discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory”
- explaining that the concept of “race” is broad within the meaning of § 1981, relying on the legislative history and common use of language at time the statute was enacted, and extending to matters of ancestry commonly associated with nationality and ethnicity, not race in a more modern sense
- holding that Iraqi-born U.S. citizen properly stated claim for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 where he alleged that employer discharged him because of his Arab ancestry, and citing cases where discrimination on basis of ancestry constituted equal protection violations
- holding that section 1981 protects persons subjected to discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Railway Labor Executives' Association v. Southern Railway Company, 860 F.2d 1038 (1988)
481 U.S. 604, -, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 2025, 95 L.Ed.2d 582, 589 (1987) — we decline to follow the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with respect to the question of prospective operation.
The opinion
*614 Justice Brennan,
concurring.
Pernicious distinctions among individuals based solely on their ancestry are antithetical to the doctrine of equality upon which this Nation is founded. Today the Court upholds Congress’ desire to rid the Nation of such arbitrary and invidious discrimination, and I concur in its opinion and judgment. I write separately only to point out that the line between discrimination based on “ancestry or ethnic characteristics,” ante, at 613, and discrimination based on “place or nation of . . . origin,” ibid., is not a bright one. It is true that one’s ancestry — the ethnic group from which an individual and his or her ancestors are descended — is not necessarily the same as one’s national origin — the country “where a person was born, or, more broadly, the country from which his or her ancestors came” Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U. S. 86, 88 (1973) (emphasis added). Often, however, the two are identical as a factual matter: one was born in the nation whose primary stock is one’s own ethnic group. Moreover, national origin claims have been treated as ancestry or ethnicity claims in some circumstances. For example, in the Title VII context, the terms overlap as a legal matter. See 29 CFR § 1606.1 (1986) (emphasis added) (national origin discrimination “includes], but [is] not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s, or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an individual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group”); Espinoza, supra, at 89 (the deletion of the word ancestry from the final version of § 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e), “was not intended as a material change, . . . suggesting that the terms ‘national origin’ and ‘ancestry’ were considered synonymous”). I therefore read the Court’s opinion to state only that discrimination based on birthplace alone is insufficient to state a claim under § 1981.