holding no right to jury trial for calculation of civil penalties under the Clean Water Act where “highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors .are necessary” to assess the penalties, and “are the kinds of calculations traditionally performed by judges”
How later courts described this case
- holding no right to jury trial for calculation of civil penalties under the Clean Water Act where “highly discretionary calculations that take into account multiple factors .are necessary” to assess the penalties, and “are the kinds of calculations traditionally performed by judges”
- explaining “the fact that the subject matter of a modern statutory action and an [eighteenth] century English action are close equivalents ‘is irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes,’ because ‘that Amendment requires trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law.’”
- holding that, in an enforcement action under the Clean Water Act, “a determination of a civil penalty is not an essential function of a jury trial, and that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial for that purpose in a civil action.”
- stating that, at common law, “[rjemedies intended to punish culpable individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo, were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Jones v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 674 F.3d 1187 (2012)
We disagree with UPS’s assertion that Tull stands for the proposition that courts are permitted to determine the amount of punitive damage awards in cases like the one presently presented.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (2018)
ed that government forfeiture actions, like the one before it, were actions tried in the Court of Exchequer in which there was a right to jury trial, but also observed that "[c]ases involving penalties to the Crown, other than forfeiture of conveyances and *476goods, were also tried by jury in the Court of Exchequer." ( 1941 Chevrolet , supra , 37 Cal.2d at p. 295, 231 P.2d 832.) *449The People nevertheless maintain…
Distinguished by Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 1991 Ala. LEXIS 1001 (1991)
Tull, therefore, is inapposite.
Distinguished by Calore Freight Systems, Inc. v. State, Department of Transportation, 1990 R.I. LEXIS 126 (1990)
481 U.S. 412, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987), are distinguishable and therefore not controlling with respect to the case at bar.
Distinguished by Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560 (1990)
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that on the factual issue of Tull’s liability, a jury trial was required under the Constitution because the remedy sought by the government was for money damages.10 Id. at 427, 107 S.Ct. at 1840-41. Tull is clearly distinguishable in that the parties in Tull had no contractual agreement to resolve factual issues in accordance with non-Article III procedures.
The opinion
Justice Scalia,
with whom Justice Stevens joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the Court’s disposition, and Parts I and II of its opinion. I do not join Part III because in my view the right to trial by jury on whether a civil penalty of unspecified amount is assessable also involves a right to trial by jury on what the amount should be. The fact that the Legislature could elect to fix the amount of penalty has nothing to do with whether, if it chooses not to do so, that element comes within the jury-trial guarantee. Congress could, I suppose, create a private cause of action by one individual against another for a fixed amount of damages, but it surely does not follow that if it creates such a cause of action without prescribing the amount of damages, that issue could be taken from the jury.
*428 While purporting to base its determination (quite correctly) upon historical practice, the Court creates a form of civil adjudication I have never encountered. I can recall no precedent for judgment of civil liability by jury but assessment of amount by the court. Even punitive damages are assessed by the jury when liability is determined in that fashion. One is of course tempted to make an exception in a case like this, where the Government is imposing a noncompen-satory remedy to enforce direct exercise of its regulatory authority, because there comes immediately to mind the role of the sentencing judge in a criminal proceeding. If criminal trials are to be the model, however, determination of liability by the jury should be on a standard of proof requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Having chosen to proceed in civil fashion, -with the advantages which that mode entails, it seems to me the Government must take the bitter with the sweet. Since, as the Court correctly reasons, the proper analogue to a civil-fine action is the common-law action for debt, the Government need only prove liability by a preponderance of the evidence; but must, as in any action for debt, accept the amount of award determined not by its own officials but by 12 private citizens. If that tends to discourage the Government from proceeding in this fashion, I doubt that the Founding Fathers would be upset.
I would reverse and remand for jury determination of both issues.