holding that if a statute required jurors to render a death verdict on the basis of some arithmetical formula, or if it forced them to impose death on any basis other than their own moral judgment, it would not pass constitutional muster
How later courts described this case
- holding that if a statute required jurors to render a death verdict on the basis of some arithmetical formula, or if it forced them to impose death on any basis other than their own moral judgment, it would not pass constitutional muster
- holding that the decision to impose the death penalty should not be based on “extraneous emotional factors” such as “mere sympathy” that are unrelated to the particular aggravating and mitigating factors at issue in the case
- concluding that a jury instruction, which told the jury not to be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling” did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
- noting that mitigation evidence “affords an opportunity to humanize and explain- to individualize a defendant outside the constraints of the normal rules of evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) — not on the Supreme Court's list
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002).
The opinion
Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
I write separately to emphasize a point to which others have alluded, see ante, at 545 (O’Connor, J., concurring); ante, at 548 and this page (Brennan, J., dissenting), but which, in my view, has not been brought into full focus.
The defense’s goal in the penalty phase of a capital trial is, of course, to receive a life sentence. See Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital Cases, 13 Akron L. Rev. 331 , 357 (1979). While the sentencer’s decision to accord life to a defendant at times might be a rational or moral one, it also may arise from the defendant’s appeal to the sentencer’s *562 sympathy or mercy, human qualities that are undeniably emotional in nature. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 38, 46, 48.
In a capital sentencing proceeding, the sentencer’s discretion must be guided to avoid arbitrary or irrational decisions. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 195 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). When a jury serves as the sentencing authority, such guidance is provided, in part, through jury instructions. This Court, however, has recognized and even safeguarded the sentencer’s power to exercise its mercy to spare the defendant’s life. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 331 (1985), quoting Caldwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 806, 817 (Miss. 1983) (dissenting opinion) (“ ‘The [mercy] plea is made directly to the jury as only they may impose the death sentence’”); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 110 (1982) (“[T]he rale in Lockett [v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978)] is the product of a considerable history reflecting the law’s effort to develop a system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and sensible to the uniqueness of the individual”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 182 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“Rather, the reluctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence may well reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases”).
The sentencer’s ability to respond with mercy towards a defendant has always struck me as a particularly valuable aspect of the capital sentencing procedure. Long ago, when, in dissent, I expressed my fear of legislation that would make the death penalty mandatory, and thus remove all discretion from the sentencer, I observed that such legislation would be “regressive ... , for it [would] eliminat[e] the element of mercy in the imposition of punishment.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 413 (1972). In my view, we adhere so strongly to our belief that sentencers should have the opportunity to spare a capital defendant’s life on account of compassion for the individual because, recognizing that the *563 capital sentencing decision must be made in the context of “contemporary values,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S., at 181 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.), we see in the sentencer’s expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply value.
In the real world, as in this case, it perhaps is unlikely that one word in an instruction would cause a jury totally to disregard mitigating factors that the defendant has presented through specific testimony. When, however, a jury member is moved to be merciful to the defendant, an instruction telling the juror that he or she cannot be “swayed” by sympathy well may arrest or restrain this humane response, with truly fatal consequences for the defendant. This possibility I cannot accept, in light of the special role of mercy in capital sentencing and the stark finality of the death sentence. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
I respectfully dissent.