finding that failure to apply a new rule of criminal procedure to cases pending on direct review when the rule is announced violates a basic norm of adjudication; the nature of judicial review precludes us from "fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new [procedural] standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule"
How later courts described this case
- finding that failure to apply a new rule of criminal procedure to cases pending on direct review when the rule is announced violates a basic norm of adjudication; the nature of judicial review precludes us from "fishing one case from the stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new [procedural] standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule"
- holding that failure to apply newly declared constitutional rule for the “conduct of criminal prosecution is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for eases in which the new rules constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past”
- explaining that "a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or A-0161-23 20 not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past"
- holding that "a new <br>rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied <br>retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct <br>review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the <br>rule constitutes a 'clear break' with the past"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by People v. Hedgecock, 51 Cal. 3d 395 (1990)
We note, however, that the continuing validity of Guerra’s test of retroactivity with respect to rulings based on the federal Constitution has been called into question by the high court’s decision in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314 [93 L.Ed.2d 649, 107 S.Ct. 708], which holds that “a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on d…
Declined to follow by Wilkerson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 498 (1994)
We decline to follow the other circuits that implicitly, and perhaps inadvertently, have applied Griffith retroactively.
Disagreed with by Commonwealth v. Waters, 400 Mass. 1006 (1987)
We have considered memoranda of the parties as to the effect of Griffith, and we disagree with the defendant’s argument.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kleinbart v. United States, 1989 D.C. App. LEXIS 22 (1989)
The government has argued in the instant case that Griffith, addressing the retroactivity of constitutional rules, is inapplicable to the rule announced in our Robinson case.
The opinion
Justice Powell,
concurring.
I join the Court’s opinion, and consider it an important step toward ending the confusion that has resulted from applying Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 (1965), on a case-by-case basis. I concluded in 1977 that the Court would be well advised to adopt Justice Harlan’s view as to the retroactive application of our decisions both with respect to cases pending at the time on direct appeal and with respect to cases pending on habeas corpus petitions. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U. S. 233, 246 (1977) (concurring in judgment). The Harlan view is stated in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 675 (1971) (opinion concurring in judgment in Mackey and dissenting from judgment in Williams v. United States, 401 U. S. 646 (1971)); and Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting opinion). I was persuaded by Justice Harlan’s reasoning then, and have followed it since. See Hankerson v. North Carolina, supra; Harlin v. Missouri, 439 U. S. 459, 460 (1979) (concurring in judgment); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U. S. 323, 337 (1980) (con *329 curring in judgment); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U. S. 638, 651 (1984) (concurring in judgment).
As the cases we decide today involve only the retroactivity of decisions pending on direct review, it was not necessary for the Court to express an opinion with respect to habeas corpus petitions. As I read the Court’s opinion, this question is carefully left open until it is squarely presented. It is to be hoped that the Court then will adopt the Harlan view of retroactivity in cases seeking relief on habeas petitions. See Mackey v. United States, supra, at 681-695. Under that view, habeas petitions generally should be judged according to the constitutional standards existing at the time of conviction.