finding that district court erred in “ignoring the sustained success [of] black voters” in electing candidates of choice, page ad in the weekly paper. He went to several meetings that were arranged by the Democratic party, and he was also able to arrange for introductions to groups that he perhaps didn’t know. 27 where the plaintiffs “failed utterly . . . to offer any explanation for the success of black candidates”
How later courts described this case
- finding that district court erred in “ignoring the sustained success [of] black voters” in electing candidates of choice, page ad in the weekly paper. He went to several meetings that were arranged by the Democratic party, and he was also able to arrange for introductions to groups that he perhaps didn’t know. 27 where the plaintiffs “failed utterly . . . to offer any explanation for the success of black candidates”
- explaining that the 1982 amendments to § 2 of the VRA were a rejection of the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), which “required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters”
- concluding that "the District Court's approach, which tested data derived from three election years in each district, and which revealed that blacks strongly supported black candidates, while, to the black candidates' usual detriment, whites rarely did, satisfactorily addresses each facet of the legal standard"
- recognizing that “[mjultimember districts and at-large election schemes ... are not per se violative of minority voters’ rights,” but affirming the district court’s conclusion that the multimember electoral structure at issue did violate § 2 because it resulted in racially discriminatory vote dilution
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Marc Veasey v. Greg Abbott, 830 F.3d 216 (2016)
The State argues that the Gingles factors are inapposite in this context, and that we should apply the two-part test as it was applied in the Seventh Circuit in Frank v. Walker, 768 F.3d 744, 754-55 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 1551, 191 L.Ed.2d 638 (2015).
Distinguished by Thompson v. Glades County Board of County Commissioners, 493 F.3d 1253 (2007)
The Supreme Court’s recent analysis in Perry that a district with a bare Latino majority failed to satisfy Gingles is inapplicable because the Supreme Court's conclusion that many of the Latinos were not citizens eligible to vote is different from the district court’s conclusion here that eligible voters might not turn out.
Distinguished by Parker v. Ohio, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (2003)
The plaintiffs cite to Footnote 2 of Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 979 (1st Cir.1995) (parallel citations omitted), as support for their argument that the first Gingles precondition is inapplicable to influence claims:
The opinion
*106 Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Marshall and Justice Blackmun join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In my opinion, the findings of the District Court, which the Court fairly summarizes, ante, at 37-41, 52-54, and n. 23, 59-61, and nn. 28 and 29, adequately support the District Court’s judgment concerning House District 23 as well as the balance of that judgment.
I, of course, agree that the election of one black candidate in each election since 1972 provides significant support for the State’s position. The notion that this evidence creates some sort of a conclusive, legal presumption, ante, at 75-76, is not, however, supported by the language of the statute or by its legislative history. 1 I therefore cannot agree with the Court’s view that the District Court committed error by failing to apply a rule of law that emerges today without statutory support. The evidence of candidate success in District 23 is merely one part of an extremely large record which the District Court carefully considered before making its ultimate findings of fact, all of which should be upheld under a normal application of the "clearly erroneous’’ standard that the Court traditionally applies. 2
The Court identifies the reason why the success of one black candidate in the elections in 1978, 1980, and 1982 is not *107 inconsistent with the District Court’s ultimate finding concerning House District 23. 3 The fact that one black candidate was also elected in the 1972, 1974, and 1976 elections, ante, at 82, Appendix B, is not sufficient, in my opinion, to overcome the additional findings that apply to House District 23, as well as to other districts in the State for each of those years. The Court accurately summarizes those findings:
“The District Court in this case carefully considered the totality of the circumstances and found that in each district racially polarized voting; the legacy of official discrimination in voting matters, education, housing, employment, and health services; and the persistence of campaign appeals to racial prejudice acted in concert with the multimember districting scheme to impair the ability of geographically insular and politically cohesive groups of black voters to participate equally in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. It found that the success a few black candidates have enjoyed in these districts is too recent, too limited, and, with regard to the 1982 elections, perhaps too aberrational, to disprove its conclusion.” Ante, at 80.
To paraphrase the Court’s conclusion about the other districts, ibid., I cannot say that the District Court, composed of local judges who are well acquainted with the political realities of the State, clearly erred in concluding that use of a multimember electoral structure has caused black voters in House District 23 to have less opportunity than white voters to elect representatives of their choice. 4 Accordingly, I con *108 cur in the Court’s opinion except Part IV-B and except insofar as it explains why it reverses the judgment respecting House District 23.
See ante, at 75 (“Section 2(b) provides that ‘[t]he extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office... is one circumstance which may be considered.’ 42 U. S. C. § 1973 (b). . . . However, the Senate Report expressly states that ‘the election of a few minority candidates does not “necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black vote,” ’ noting that if it did, ‘the possibility exists that the majority citizens might evade [§ 2] by manipulating the election of a “safe” minority candidate.’ . . . The Senate Committee decided, instead, to ‘“require an independent consideration of the record” ’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
See ante, at 79 (“[T]he application of the clearly-erroneous standard to ultimate findings of vote dilution preserves the benefit of the trial court’s particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law”).
See ante, at 52-54, and n. 23, 60, n. 29, 75-76.
Even under the Court’s analysis, the decision simply to reverse — without a remand — is mystifying. It is also extremely unfair. First, the Court does not give appellees an opportunity to address the new legal standard that the Court finds decisive. Second, the Court does not even bother to explain the contours of that standard, and why it was not satisfied in this case. Cf. ante, at 77, n. 38 (“We have no occasion in this case *108 to decide what types of special circumstances could satisfactorily demonstrate that sustained success does not accurately reflect the minority’s ability to elect its preferred representatives”). Finally, though couched as a conclusion about a “matter of law,” ante, at 77, the Court’s abrupt entry of judgment for appellants on District 23 reflects an unwillingness to give the District Court the respect it is due, particularly when, as in this case, the District Court has a demonstrated knowledge and expertise of the entire context that Congress directed it to consider.