stating that to show a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a petitioner for habeas corpus “must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that to show a violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a petitioner for habeas corpus “must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.”
- holding that “the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks”
- concluding that defendant's right to counsel not violated under Henry where police placed informant in defendant's cell because informant obeyed instructions not to question defendant, but merely to listen for information
- holding that no Sixth Amendment violation had occurred where the defendant's statements to the informant were volunteered and the volunteering of the information was precipitated by events beyond the informant's control
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported superseded by statute, as recognized in Banister v. Davis — not on the Supreme Court's list
477 U.S. 436, 459 , superseded by statute as stated in Banister v. Davis (2020) __ U.S. __ [ 140 S.Ct. 1698, 1709, fn. 8
The opinion
Chief Justice BURGER,
concurring.
I agree fully with the Court’s opinion and judgment. This case is clearly distinguishable from United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264 (1980). There is a vast difference between placing an “ear” in the suspect’s cell and placing a voice in the cell to encourage conversation for the “ear” to record.
Furthermore, the abuse of the Great Writ needs to be curbed so as to limit, if not put a stop to, the “sporting contest” theory of criminal justice so widely practiced today.