concluding that defendant had failed to carry his burden of establishing prejudice from counsel’s failure to introduce sufficient mitigating evidence; noting that “[a]ny attempt to portray petitioner as a nonviolent man would have opened the door for the State to rebut with evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions,” and explaining that “[t]his evidence had not previously been admitted in evidence,” but “trial counsel reasonably could have viewed it as particularly damaging” (emphasis added)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that defendant had failed to carry his burden of establishing prejudice from counsel’s failure to introduce sufficient mitigating evidence; noting that “[a]ny attempt to portray petitioner as a nonviolent man would have opened the door for the State to rebut with evidence of petitioner’s prior convictions,” and explaining that “[t]his evidence had not previously been admitted in evidence,” but “trial counsel reasonably could have viewed it as particularly damaging” (emphasis added)
- holding that the prosecutors’ improper statements did not warrant a new trial because “the prosecutors’ argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent” and because “[m]uch of the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense”
- holding that the prosecutors’ comments did not deprive pe titioner of a fair trial since “[t]he prosecutors’ argument did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, nor did it implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent” and “[m]ueh of the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense”
- finding no due process violation where the prosecutor’s arguments contained highly inflammatory remarks, e.g., “[defendant] shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him and a prison guard at the other end of that leash” but did not “manipulate or misstate the evidence or implicate other specific rights of the accused ... such as the right to remain silent.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Sandy, 1994 Mo. App. LEXIS 1028 (1994)
However, in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), the Court held Caldwell was inapplicable to a prosecutor’s comment to the jury that a death sentence was the only way to prevent a similar future act.
The opinion
Chief Justice Burger,
concurring.
I concur fully in the opinion for the Court and write separately only to address the suggestion in Justice Blackmun’s dissent that the Court rejects Darden’s Wither-spoon claim because of its “impatience with the progress of Darden’s constitutional challenges to his conviction.” Post, at 204. In support of this contention, reference is made to my dissent from the grant of certiorari in this case. The dissent states that I voted to deny the petition because Darden’s claims have been reviewed by 95 judges in the 12 years since his conviction. This is simply incorrect. To set the record straight, I quote my dissent in full:
“In the 12 years since petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, the issues now raised in the petition for certiorari have been considered by this Court four times, see Darden v. Florida, 430 U. S. 704 (1977) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted); Darden v. Wainwright, 467 U. S. 1230 (1984) (denying certio-rari); Wainwright v. Darden, 469 U. S. 1202 (1985) (vacating and remanding 725 F. 2d 1526 (CA11 1984)); Darden v. Wainwright, [ 473 U. S. 927 ] (order dated September 3, 1985, denying application for stay), and have been passed upon no fewer than 95 times by federal and *188 state court judges. Upon review of the petition and the history of this case, I conclude that no issues are presented that merit plenary review by this Court. Because we abuse our discretion when we accept meritless petitions presenting claims that we rejected only hours ago, I dissent.” 473 U. S. 929 (1985).
As my dissent makes clear, I voted to deny the petition in this extraordinary case because the meritless claims raised did not require plenary review. Full briefing and oral argument have not changed my views.
The dissent’s suggestion that this Court is motivated by impatience with Darden’s constitutional claims is refuted by the record; the 13 years of judicial proceedings in this case manifest substantial care and patience. Our rejection of Darden’s claims in this the fourth time he has sought review in this Court is once again based on a thoughtful application of the law to the facts of the case. At some point there must be finality.