holding that the State of Maine, which had intervened in a federal criminal prosecution under Section 2403(b) in order to defend the constitutionality of one of it statutes, could appeal from the judgment in the prosecution because it had “a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes” that “satisf[ied] the constitutional requirement of genuine adversity”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the State of Maine, which had intervened in a federal criminal prosecution under Section 2403(b) in order to defend the constitutionality of one of it statutes, could appeal from the judgment in the prosecution because it had “a legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes” that “satisf[ied] the constitutional requirement of genuine adversity”
- holding that the State of Maine, an intervenor in the district court and the only ap- pealing party, had standing to appeal because, “if the judg- ment of the Court of Appeals [was] left undisturbed,” Maine would “be bound by the conclusive adjudication” that its law was unenforceable
- explaining that "the empirical component" of scrutiny under the Commerce Clause, "like any other form of factfinding, is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts" (citation modified) (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982))
- explaining that the Commerce Clause does not allow locales to further legitimate environmental purposes by forcing outsiders to “bear the brunt of the conservation program for no apparent reason other than that they lived and voted in other” jurisdictions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
There is something fishy about this case. Maine is the only State in the Union that blatantly discriminates against out-of-state baitfish by flatly prohibiting their importation. Although golden shiners are already present and thriving in Maine (and, perhaps not coincidentally, the subject of a flourishing domestic industry), Maine excludes golden shiners grown and harvested (and, perhaps not coincidentally, sold) in other States. This kind of stark discrimination against out-of-state articles of commerce requires rigorous justification by the discriminating State. “When discrimination against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.” Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U. S. 333, 353 (1977).
Like the District Court, the Court concludes that uncertainty about possible ecological effects from the possible presence of parasites and nonnative species in shipments of out-of-state shiners suffices to carry the State’s burden of proving a legitimate public purpose. Ante, at 142-143, 148. The Court similarly concludes that the State has no obligation to develop feasible inspection procedures that would make a total ban unnecessary. Ante, at 147. It seems clear, however, that the presumption should run the other way. Since the State engages in obvious discrimination against out-of-state commerce, it should be put to its proof. Ambiguity about dangers and alternatives should actually defeat, rather than sustain, the discriminatory measure.
*153 This is not to derogate the State’s interest in ecological purity. But the invocation of environmental protection or public health has never been thought to confer some kind of special dispensation from the general principle of nondiscrimination in interstate commerce. “A different view, that the ordinance is valid simply because it professes to be a health measure, would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no restraints on state action other than those laid down by the Due Process Clause, save for the rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to discriminate against interstate goods.” Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U. S. 349, 354 (1951). If Maine wishes to rely on its interest in ecological preservation, it must show that interest, and the infeasibility of other alternatives, with far greater specificity. Otherwise, it must further that asserted interest in a manner far less offensive to the notions of comity and cooperation that underlie the Commerce Clause.
Significantly, the Court of Appeals, which is more familiar with Maine’s natural resources and with its legislation than we are, was concerned by the uniqueness of Maine’s ban. That court felt, as I do, that Maine’s unquestionable natural splendor notwithstanding, the State has not carried its substantial burden of proving why it cannot meet its environmental concerns in the same manner as other States with the same interest in the health of their fish and ecology. Cf. ante, at 151, n. 22 (describing less restrictive procedures in other States).
I respectfully dissent;